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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the kenotic motif in the theology of
Hans Urs von Balthasar, particularly in light of his concern to protect human agency.
This dissertation argues that Balthasar views kenotic spiritual practice as the pathway to
achieve true human agency. This kenotic pathway to agency is placed in contrast to
Balthasar’s concept of original sin as an attempt by humanity to achieve agency on their
own terms. The narrative of original sin results in two possible outcomes for Balthasar: a
spiritual pathway toward the absorption of the self, which results in the annihilation of
the self or, the autonomy of the self is emphasized to the degree that self-actualization
becomes the goal of the spiritual journey and other humans are seen as obstacles to selfrealization. This project explores the themes of kenosis within the doctrine of the
Incarnation and Trinity as the solution to understanding human agency and as the answer
to original sin in and through the Incarnation. The Christological and Trinitarian shape of
sainthood and spirituality are explored in the final two chapters. Balthasar’s treatment of
St. John of the Cross, St. Thérèse of Lisieux, and Elisabeth of the Trinity are examples of
how the kenotic motif is revealed in the lives of the saints. The final chapter looks at
Balthasar’s spirituality as thoroughly kenotic and that this kenotic activity cannot be
systematized into a universal ethical or spiritual model; rather, it is enacted through
discernment. This discernment is based on the norm of the gospel as “hard sayings” and
as “good news.” Each individual human being is invited to take on a unique mission,
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which forms them into a theological person, those providing a deep and real sense of
human agency. The dissertation ends with a speculative interaction of Balthasar’s
kenotic thought with three other scholars, Edith Wyschogrod, Sarah Coakley, and Sallie
McFague, in order to offer a glimpse into future discussions of kenosis in contemporary
theology.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE BOUNDARIES OF KENOSIS
In Matthew 16:24-25, Jesus says to his disciples, “If anyone wishes to come after
Me, he must deny himself, and take up his cross and follow Me. For whoever wishes to
save his life will lose it; but whoever loses his life for My sake will find it.” Some strands
of traditional Christianity interpret this (and other biblical passages like it) in a manner
that encourages self-abnegation and personal trauma in the name of Christian
discipleship. In early Christianity, those tortured and martyred Christians were viewed
with particular reverence by the church. One vivid and graphic example of this
phenomenon of self-abnegation occurs in the letters of Ignatius of Antioch. Apprehended
by the Roman government and on the way to face martyrdom in Rome, he wrote several
letters to Christian churches during his journey. In his Letter to the Romans he writes:
I am writing to all the Churches and I enjoin all, that I am dying willingly for
God’s sake, if only you do not prevent it. I beg you, do not do me an untimely
kindness. Allow me to be eaten by the beasts, which are my way of reaching to
God. I am God’s wheat, and I am to be ground by the teeth of wild beasts, so that
I may become the pure bread of Christ.1
Ignatius viewed his certain death at the hands of the Romans to be of positive value even
to the point that he did not want intervention on his behalf. In addition to the clear
statements that Ignatius envisioned his martyrdom as a profoundly personal and
volitional act, he also believes that his actions and his death will ultimately take on a
christological significance. He hopes to become “the pure bread of Christ.” This is a

1

Ignatius of Antioch, “Letter to the Romans,” in The Early Christian Fathers, ed. Cyril
Richardson (New York: Touchstone, 1996), 104.
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significant reference to the Eucharist and its relation to Jesus’ crucifixion. Ignatius is
emulating a christological concept of self-sacrifice, interpreting his own agency through
the lens of the Incarnation, death and resurrection of Jesus himself. In this dissertation I
will call this constellation of meaning the “kenotic motif” or principle.2 Kenosis is a
Greek term that means emptying. This term has been applied to the Incarnation, mainly,
in Christian history. However, Christian spirituality, operating in accordance with the
idea that we should model our lives after Christ, has used words like self-surrender,
mortification, indifference, and apatheia, to describe a specific experience of emptying
that takes place within the Christian discipleship.
The Problem
The sentiments of Ignatius are not an isolated instance in Christian history. The
impact of the kenotic structure of spirituality and Christology has continued in a variety
of forms and expressions. In the twentieth century, with the collapse of the
Enlightenment ideal of “progress,” two world wars, and the horrors of the Holocaust,
Western theology has become preoccupied with suffering, theodicy, and human agency.
Genocide, imperialism, the collapse of metaphysics, the feminist and civil rights
movements, and the rise of the so-called hermeneutics of suspicion and Marxist theories
of class struggle have ushered in a new concern in postmodern Christianity in light of
human flourishing.
These events and intellectual movements have heightened and altered some of the
tensions present in the kenotic motif. It has become more commonplace to posit that this
2

Terms such as “self-sacrifice, self-giving, abandonment, kenosis, and self-emptying” will be
treated as very similar in meaning. For a discussion on these terms and possible ways of distinguishing
between them, see Ruth Groenhout, “Kenosis and Feminist Theory,” in Exploring Kenotic Christology:
The Self-Emptying of God, ed. C. Stephen Evans (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 290-312.
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kenotic theme places the suffering and sacrifice of the cross directly in contact with the
divine being itself, leading some theologians to claim God suffers alongside us in
solidarity.3 There are also theological perspectives that use the motif of kenosis as a
spiritual path to freedom from oppression and enhanced personal agency. Sarah Coakley,
for example, argues for a version of kenosis based in vulnerable contemplation, believing
that a reformulated notion of traditional forms of kenosis is “crucial for my understanding
of a specifically Christian form of feminism.”4 Rosemary Ruether also affirms the idea of
a “kenosis of patriarchy,”5 a subversive indictment against all hierarchical and patriarchal
ways of living. Oliver Davies calls it “dispossesive intentionality” and believes that
society would crumble without the practice of self-emptying.6
Yet, other contemporary thinkers have grave concerns about this kenotic model of
God and the spiritual ethos of Christians such as Ignatius of Antioch. It may come as no
surprise to those familiar with the postmodern situation that language of self-emptying
and sacrifice come under heavy suspicion. Is it not this type of rhetoric and metaphor that
has encouraged submissive and self-destructive behavior, often encouraging the
oppressed to stay in unjust and abusive situations? Does not self-sacrifice turn human
beings into passive shells of humanity, drawing victimization and suffering like a
magnet? Certainly, some postmodern theologians believe that the answer to these
3

For a brief description of the historical factors that contributed to this theological paradigm shift,
see Ronald Goetz, “The Suffering God: The Rise of a New Orthodoxy,” Christian Century, April 16 1986,
385-389.
4
Sarah Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion: On the Representation of “Vulnerability” in Christian
Feminist Writing,” in Powers and Submissions: Spirituality, Philosophy, and Gender (Malden, MA:
Blackwell, 2002), 5.
5
Rosemary R. Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1993), 137.
6
Oliver Davies, A Theology of Compassion: Metaphysics and the Renewal of Tradition (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 16-17. The first two chapters are grouped under the heading “Kenotic
Ontology,” in which Davies uses kenotic themes to describe ontology and the self.

4

questions is “yes.” Daphne Hampson believes that in the case of women, “the theme of
self-emptying and self-abnegation is far from helpful as a paradigm.”7 Darby Kathleen
Ray, too, says that “the salvific values of suffering, self-sacrifice, and obedience are too
easily distorted into a theological tool of subjugation.”8 Marit Trelstad believes these
themes could encourage a “hero-victim relation, even if it claims to offer protection and
salvation, there is an inherent disregard of the presumed victim’s self-agency.”9 James
Cone asserts that the dominating white theology of America “becomes a sedative that
makes the victims of injustice content with servitude. Without struggle, the negative
suffering inflicted by oppressors becomes positive and thus leads to passivity and
submission. Without struggle, the idea of redemption becomes a human creation . . .
designed to numb the pain” instead of bring about human flourishing.10
The charge laid down by all of these thinkers in their own way is if the kenotic
motif is to survive as a viable theme in Christianity, it must be subjected to a new set of
criteria and refashioned and clarified in a manner that does not obscure the liberating
power of the gospel. If some of these more sobering charges are true of kenotic discourse,
then all who employ kenotic language are encouraging bondage and passivity instead of
extolling the freedom offered in Christ. The crux of the matter is this: does kenotic
discourse make disciples or produce victims?
The Argument

7

Daphne Hampson, Theology and Feminism (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 1991), 155.
Quoted in Mark A. Mcintosh, Divine Teaching: An Introduction to Christian Theology (Malden,
MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007), 96.
9
Marit Trelstad, “Introduction,” in Cross Examinations: Readings on the Meaning of the Cross
Today, ed. Marit Trelstad (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Press, 2006), 7.
10
James Cone, God of the Oppressed (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1997), 168.
8
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These themes and questions raised thus far should indicate that there are many
avenues from which to approach this problem of kenosis and human flourishing.
For example, one could examine kenosis through a survey of changes in the kenotic motif
throughout history. This was undertaken in the 70’s by Donald Dawe and also more
recently by David Brown.11 Another approach would be to examine only contemporary
discussions of kenosis. Yet another approach would be to focus on a particular thinker
that emphasizes kenosis in some way: P.T. Forsyth, Jürgen Moltmann, Sarah Coakley,
Oliver Davies, Sergei Bulgakov, and various philosophers would be worthy of such a
study.
This dissertation will approach the problem through the theology of Hans Urs von
Balthasar. While the contemporary problem of human flourishing remains of interest and
present as an implicit conversation partner; the content of this dissertation will be the
theme of kenosis as it operates within Balthasar’s writings. I chose Balthasar for this
study for three main reasons: First, this conversation about kenosis and Balthasar has
already begun. Aristotle Papanikolaou’s article “Person, Kenosis, and Abuse: Hans Urs
von Balthasar and Feminist Theologies in Conversation” in Modern Theology began a
dialogue about Balthasar’s kenosis and what it might mean for a contemporary
anthropology.12 Papanikolaou’s work was also continued in a 2012 article by Carolyn
Chau entitled, “What Could Possibly Be Given?: Towards an Exploration of Kenosis as
Forgiveness-Continuing the Conversation Between Coakley, Hampson, and

11

Donald G. Dawe, The Form of a Servant: A Historical Analysis of the Kenotic Motif
(Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963). David Brown, Divine Humanity: Kenosis and the Construction of a
Christian Theology (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2011).
12
Aristotle Papanikolaou, “Person, Kenosis and Abuse: Hans Urs von Balthasar and Feminist
Theologies in Conversation,” Modern Theology 19, no. 1 (2004).
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Papanikolaou.”13 I see my own work as a participation in these conversations through a
more extended treatment of Balthasar’s writings.
Second, Balthasar is influential in contemporary theology but often
misunderstood. Many aspects of his theology are polarizing. It is my hope that this
dissertation can provide some clarity in Balthasar’s theology as well as suggesting that
theologians in the contemporary situation need not either accept Balthasar’s theology
wholeheartedly or roundly reject it. In the case of kenosis, I hope to show that his thought
offers a flexibility that he himself did not make use of in terms of the application of selfsurrender.
Third, my own research and interests have centered on Balthasar’s theology for
quite some time now. I find his theology valuable, challenging, and interesting. When I
discovered Papanikolaou’s article, I felt that his work and the suggestions he made
begged for a deeper treatment of Balthasar’s sources than the length of an article would
allow and that is how this project began.
While the problem of kenosis in the contemporary context cannot be quickly or
easily solved, and it is not my intention to do so, I will argue that Balthasar’s use of the
kenotic motif is intended to preserve and facilitate personal agency and prevent the loss
of self. I defend that statement in two main parts.14 The first part of my argument will
investigate Balthasar’s criticisms of a variety of worldviews. I will establish that the

13

Carolyn A. Chau, “What Could Possibly Be Given?: Towards an Exploration of Kenosis as
Forgiveness-Continuing the Conversation Between Coakley, Hampson, and Papanikolaou,” Modern
Theology 28, no. 1 (2012).
14
While these are the two main parts of my argument the content of the dissertation will be
skewed heavily toward the second part because Balthasar’s positive constructions are most worthy of
inspection. The first part of the argument serves as boundary markers from which to guide us through the
real important pieces of Balthasar’s thought.
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essence of these critical comments point to a unifying concern: to protect the integrity of
human agency. I will use these criticisms to discover the boundaries of Balthasar’s
kenotic discourse that will allow me to clarify what Balthasar does not mean when he
speaks of self-emptying, self-surrender, self-giving and so forth.15 I use the term “selfannihilation” to describe the outer edge of Balthasar’s definition of kenosis and I will
describe ways in which Balthasar sees self-annihilation occurring.16
Second, I will analyze the positive construction of kenosis within Balthasar’s
work. He believes that kenotic love is the only way to safeguard the self on an
ontological as well as spiritual level. This will require both examining kenosis in terms of
a multilayered approach to relational love that expresses itself in christological and
Trinitarian language in addition to understanding Balthasar’s description of selfhood and
spirituality.
This introductory chapter will concentrate on two related but separate areas. The
first area will provide an overview of Balthasar’s theological style and in general terms,
describe the difference between motif, doctrine, and the problematic language
15

I see this aspect of my dissertation to function in a similar manner to what Kevin Mongrain does
in his book, Kevin Mongrain, The Sytematic Thought of Hans Urs von Balthasar: An Irenaean Retrieval
(New York: Herder & Herder, 2002). Mongrain argues for the centrality of an Irenaean vision of
Christianity to Balthasar, which is the mutual glorification of humanity and God. But at the same time he is
not attempting to address the accuracy of Balthasar’s reading of Irenaeus as based in the Irenaean texts. My
argument is similar in that it is not my intention to analyze the strength of Balthasar’s reading of other
religions or philosophies. It is my intention to describe what Balthasar sees as problematic within them and
to show how those problems indicate something vital about the boundaries within the kenotic motif
operates in his work.
16
It must be acknowledged that “self-annihilation” does not always take on a negative tone for
Balthasar. It depends on context. However, out of all the terms Balthasar uses to describe the phenomenon
of kenosis is most clearly on the fringe. “Talk of ‘annihilation’ takes on contrary meanings, depending on
whether the criterion is the un-word or the super-word. If the absolute is the One that excludes any sort of
multiplicity and so rules out anything that exists after the manner of worldly being, whether material or
spiritual, it can be attained or at least touched only through the radical removal of finite being. Such is the
path of all extrabiblical forms of religious mysticism.” Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Logic: Theological
Logical Theory: Volume II: Truth of God, trans. Adrian J. Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004),
120-121. Hereafter cited as TL II.
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surrounding kenosis. Once these preliminaries are established, the second area will
typologize Balthasar’s criticisms of an array of philosophies, religions, and spiritualities.
It is my contention, in this second area, that Balthasar’s criticisms of other religions
center mainly on their understanding of human flourishing and the relation of that
flourishing to a kenotic model of divine and human activity.
The Context
Balthasar was extremely well-read, and his criticisms of other views often appear
in terse, general statements. He often consolidated all of his expansive reading by
establishing two extremes and placing his own thought in between. This leaves almost
any interpreter, no matter how learned, feeling as if Balthasar has done away with entire
schools of thought with a casual stroke of the pen.
Take, for example, the organizational structure of Balthasar’s book Love Alone is
Credible.17 Balthasar organizes this book around the ideological constructions of the
cosmos and the human person. After a one-hundered-and-forty-six-page litany of names,
thinkers, and eras of history he distills the opposing positions down to two insufficient
categories. Balthasar offers his solution to these historical insufficiencies, a third category
of unprecedented kenotic love, as the meaning of the universe, central ethical ideal, and
highest integrative motif. “The point of integration cannot lie in cosmology. . . . But it is
also not possible that the point should lie in anthropology, because man is no measure for
God, and man’s answer is no measure for the Word that is sent to him.”18 This is a

17
18

Hans Urs von Balthasar, Love Alone is Credible (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 147.
Ibid.
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powerful polemic approach that can be a barrier to those who wish bring Balthasar’s
thought into dialogue with others.
Balthasar’s positive constructions also receive equal puzzlement from some
interpreters. His close relationship to the mystic, Adrienne von Speyr is often ignored, his
treatment of the descent into hell has raised questions about his orthodoxy, and his
unusual approach to the study of the early Fathers have drawn criticism from academic
specialists in those fields.19 But most important, for our purposes, is to grasp the inner
style and logic that gives rise to both Balthasar’s criticisms of other systems of belief and
the content of his theology. Balthasar’s approach suffuses his criticisms and his
constructions with figurative, metaphorical, robust, speculative, and allusive language.
This style causes consternation for those who came after Balthasar. On the one
hand, the scholar can’t help but experience a sense of freedom and exhilaration at this
affective and heady mixture of ideas expressed with such force and creativity. But on the
other, his work also tends to leave the reader without the clear and comforting
demarcations of a more conventional systematic theology.20

19

For more on this issue of the descent see Edward T. Oakes, “The Internal Logic of Holy
Saturday in the Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 9, no.
2 (2007): 184-199. Alyssa Pitstick, “Development of Doctrine, or Denial? Balthasar's Holy Saturday and
Newman's Essay,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 11(2009): 131-145., Gavin D’Costa, “The
Descent into Hell as a Solution for the Problem of the Fate of Unevangelized non-Christians: Balthasar's
Hell, the Limbo of the Fathers, and Purgatory,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 11, no. 2
(2009): 146-171. Edward T. Oakes, “Descensus and Development: A Response to Recent Rejoinders,”
International Journal of Systematic Theology 13, no. 1 (2011): 3-24. For von Speyr see Mongrain, The
Systematic Thought of Hans Urs von Balthasar, 10-12. For the Fathers, see Polycarp Sherwood, “Survey
of Recent Work on St. Maximus the Confessor,” Traditio 20(1964): 428-437.
20
R.R. Reno addressed this aspect of Balthasar’s style in a negative way, almost to the point of
suggesting that Balthasar did Catholicism a disservice. See R.R. Reno, “Theology After the Revolution,”
First Things (May 2007). While Reno’s point agrees with my exploration of Balthasar’s boundaries, I have
some reservations of Reno’s proposal for a more systematic style of presentation. For a more positive
review of Balthasar’s style, see Angelo Scola, Hans Urs von Balthasar: A Theological Style (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1995).
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Yet it is not mere rhetorical flourish: this “style” does not just dance across the
surface of the Balthasarian waters. It is equally evident in the organization he employs
(contrary to the usual systematic expression in terms of theological loci) and in the
sources he draws from.21 Balthasar remains a much more staunchly anti-systematic
thinker than those who take the Neo-Scholastic approach. Balthasar, in reflecting on his
own work, described his approach to theology as moving along the path of Goethe while
theologians like Rahner, choose the path of Kant.22 To put the difference rather crudely,
Balthasar, in following Goethe tends to view reality from an aesthetic and
phenomenological perspective, rather than choosing a Kantian instrumentality of
practical reason.
While Balthasar may lack the typical conceptual overlay that does not mean there
is no coherence or organization, and some scholars have argued persuasively that there is
an internal logic to help assuage the confusion. This study, on the kenotic motif, will
build on this scholarship that envisions an internal logic within Balthasar’s theology.23
Yet, before attending to this internal logic, I would like to move from the difficulty of
Balthasar’s style to the problem of kenosis itself. Kenotic language, which is already
inherently paradoxical, becomes even more complicated when expressed in Balthasar’s

21

If Balthasar’s theological sources point us toward a different theological style, Aidan Nichols
makes the important point that “playwrights, poets and novelists as theological sources [are] as important
as the fathers or the schoolmen.”Aidan Nichols, “Introduction,” in Mysterium Paschale (San Francisco:
Ignatius Press, 2000), 1.
22
Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Geist und Feuer: Ein Gespräch mit Hans Urs von Balthasar,” Herder
Korrespondenz 30(1976): 72-82. Quoted in Edward T. Oakes, Pattern of Redemption: The Theology of
Hans Urs von Balthasar (New York: Continuum, 1994), 72-73. Oakes goes into fascinating detail about the
differences of these two approaches.
23
Kevin Mongrain does something similar in his book that he calls the “Doxological Rule of
Resistance,” which is a set of internal criteria that he believes assist in helping scholars understand the
Balthasar’s theology. Mongrain, The Systematic Thought of Hans Urs von Balthasar, 201-206.
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style. The next section will address how the motif of kenosis functions in this
dissertation.
It is important to explore briefly what motifs are and how they differ from
doctrine. Doctrine is usually divided up into topics such as the Christian life, the nature of
God, salvation, and the person and work of Jesus. These are presented as discrete yet
connected topics and are often expressed in the form of propositions. The idea of motif,
as described by Dawe and Anders Nygren, is a “broad assertion” at the core of
something.24
Kenosis is a motif that speaks to the core of Christianity and reoccurs in many
different contexts. The “broad assertion” is that God’s relationship to sinners is
characterized by his infinite and continual self-gift. It is infinite because God’s resources
are, of course, unlimited. This self-gift reoccurs in various biblical stories. It recurs in
theological extrapolations, as well as spiritual treatises and hymns. It forms the central
piece of the Eucharist and other liturgical practices. It informs our ethics and our
decisions about what a good life might look like.
In choosing the path of Goethe, Balthasar allows for a freedom in expression of
the kenotic motif that many other theologians are either unwilling to or incapable of
executing. Balthasar is less concerned with presenting an orderly and sequential
presentation of Christian theology than allowing the essential core of the Christian faith
to be illustrated and revealed in a myriad of ways. His approach is more
phenomenological.

24

Dawe, The Form of a Servant: A Historical Analysis of the Kenotic Motif, 19.
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The second inference that justifies my approach is that the relation that Dawe
sees between motif and doctrine follows the organization of this dissertation. I will be
examining how kenosis changes depending on the doctrinal context and how the themes
of kenosis impact those doctrines. This will provide at least some order to the kenotic
motif, which is sorely needed if we are to avoid using it in a manner that contradicts the
human flourishing that is contained in the offer of salvation as truly good news. Yet as a
motif, kenosis is used in a variety of doctrines and in spiritual writings and it appears
under the guise of terms such as abandonment, indifference, self-surrender, self-sacrifice,
self-giving, agape, and others. The definition is simply “emptying,” yet its meaning has a
power that underlies liturgy, ethics, anthropology, spirituality, and theology. This is why
I am using the term kenosis not only in reference to the original Greek terminology and
its biblical reference but also using it to represent this motif in more general terms. I
chose to use the term kenosis to describe this entire phenomenon because of its biblical
origins and its connection to the doctrine of the Incarnation. For Balthasar, the
Incarnation is the central piece of revelation and it is the only basis for the kenotic motif.
The Fruit of Original Sin: Absorption and Autonomy
One way to think about Balthasar’s theological commitments is to begin with
what he sees as the central problem, i.e., how Balthasar talks about original sin. In
humanity’s original state,
the deepest longing of man is to ascend to God, to become like God indeed to
become equal to God. . . . But we know that the serpent got a hold of this very
innermost drive of man [toward God and transcendence] to press on to God, and
poisoned it. Original sin does not sit somewhere on the periphery of human
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nature; no, the very promise eritis sicut dei [you shall be like gods] is the
perversion of the original core of man’s being itself.25
In his concept of original sin, a natural and good desire–to be like God–becomes
perverted so that humanity no longer seeks this transcendence in cooperation with God’s
intention, but “gives his notice to God that he will no longer do God’s service.”26
Balthasar’s theology is characterized–and his reading of intellectual and spiritual history
informed–by this understanding of original sin as a human initiative to engage with God
in a manner that God has not decreed. Every single religion, philosopher, and spiritual
path in existence bears within it this problem.
Apart from God, this leaves humanity with two choices, according to Balthasar.
The history of spirituality, philosophy, and religion can’t escape the “despairing dialectic
between the identification of itself with God and the denial of God, only to arrive in the
end, at a chaotic failure to distinguish between the two.”27 I term these two approaches
absorption and autonomy. In Balthasar’s understanding, both of these approaches arise
from faulty uses of the kenotic motif and lead to what I term self-annihilation.”
Balthsasar’s problem with philosophies of absorption is that they deny the agency
of the individual, rendering him or her passive and incapable of achieving a dynamic
relationship with the divine. This category of absorption applies to those who view
spirituality as a necessary escape from creaturely limitation. Creaturely life is considered
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a “burden” to be overcome by losing one’s self in the Absolute Spirit.28 The spiritual
practice that follows out of this approach is devastating to the self:
Thus one finds in one’s human nature a place-perhaps only a point, but this point
suffices-where one can, as it were, traffic with God ‘religiously’ on the same
footing, where a mystical identity obtains between Creator and creature. Now to
reach this mysterious identity-point requires all kinds of strenuous effort: The
earthly atemporal now seem in this regard to be only an external husk that
envelopes and hides the inner kernel which must be shattered ascetically,
‘denied,’ and made transparent. The perfected and knowing exercitant looks
through all this as mere appearance, for all non-identity with the divine is
basically a non-being; and this applies as well therefore to the constricted ego and
to one’s unique individuality.29
In other words, kenosis in the absorption model focuses on the removal of the earthly,
the body, the creature, viewing it as an obstacle for the divine spark of humanity’s
unification with divine fullness.
Take for example, the practice of nonviolence in the Eastern religions. This
example of classic absorption spirituality is undergirded by the metaphysical belief that
separation, including the existence of individual experience, is an illusion. Therefore,
Balthasar avers, these spiritual paths “since the Upanishads–in Buddhism, Jainism,
Vishnuism . . . aim to destroy the appearance of personality.”30 To Balthasar, this
nonviolent approach is fundamentally misguided because the agency of the individual is
already obliterated because there is no such thing as an individual. Nonviolence is
embraced upon the prior assumption that individual physical suffering is an illusion.
Balthasar also decries a modern interpretation of absorption, which it is less about
the surrender of individuality to become one with an Absolute divine being and more
28
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about the individual’s surrender to an ideal or societal goal–even one that is thoroughly
materialistic and atheistic in nature. Balthasar believes the philosophies of Marx and
Hegel are dangerous for that reason. Kevin Mongrain remarks,
von Balthasar demonstrates that Hegel believes that the particular individual must
make an act of absolute surrender to the “generalized individual” of the nation or
the state. This act of surrender requires the overcoming of the point of view of
insane self-conceit, which undertakes to improve the world according to the ‘law
of one’s own undisciplined heart’ . . . ; the overcoming of the point of view of
private virtue, which is ‘conquered by the world’s onward course.’ Von Balthasar
goes on to explain-directly quoting Hegel's highly pejorative terminology that this
overcoming of self in surrender to the state requires also that one surrender all
personal care for anything that one could call one’s own, the desire to be
recognized by others, and the “hypocrisy” that one’s “conscience” is absolute.
Thus for Hegel, on von Balthasar's interpretation, reconciling the finite particular
and the infinite universal requires the complete relinquishing of personal
existence in a total surrender to assimilation by the “absolute spirit” as it is
expressed in the “community of the nation” in its political organization by the
state; this total surrender finds its highest expression in the individual's
willingness to undergo death as a sign of solidarity with the nation.31
Whether it is the stages of purification, purgation, and illumination of the Eastern
Religions or the totalitarian vision of Hegel and Marx, Balthasar subjects them to the
same criticisms: in varying degrees they take the practice of kenotic love out of its proper
context and thus destroy its power to transform the individual. In particular there are two
main faults that merit further exploration: it glorifies suffering, and promotes a passive
spirituality.
Suffering is absolutely not an intrinsic good in Balthasar’s understanding and
should, therefore, not be glorified. It remains an inevitable experience for the Christian on
the spiritual journey but Balthasar does not consider it to have inherent value. What
matters is the disposition of the Christian who faces suffering.
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It is not a question of glorifying earthly suffering (often the result of worldly
injustice) [Mt. 5:6], persecution [5:10] and abuse [5:11], which could be morally
doubtful) but of whether we are open or closed to the fundamental values of the
kingdom of God. Such openness can prove itself through action, even through
militancy, just as much as through endurance.32
Not only does Balthasar condemn the glorification of suffering but resistance to suffering
is an inference from this passage. Even in the life of a saint, where the extremes of love
reach heightened proportions, Balthasar places a cautionary word about using suffering as
a spiritual tool of growth. “The point isn’t the record of suffering but the intensity of love.
Every penance that increases true love is good; any penance that narrows and preoccupies
the soul is harmful.”33 This statement shows a considerable concern for the individual as
they discern their own call in the midst of the kingdom.
For some, their callings may well involve suffering–that is not to be debated. But
suffering is neither an end in itself nor something that should be always avoided. There is
a level of discernment that is necessary. Suffering must be chosen only when love is
present and the will of God is clear. It is when “the attitude of renunciation hardens to a
defence against pain and death–and thus also against love–it becomes self-deception.”34
This is precisely what Balthasar sees happening in the absorption typology.
“Buddhists and Stoics train themselves to enter a sphere without suffering and hate; the
impact of contradictions does not affect them, for they communicate with the enemy in a
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supra-personal absolute. The Christian, however, must open his heart and allow himself
to be the most intimately affected, challenged, hurt.”35
Balthasar also condemns absorption philosophies because they promote passive
spiritualities, in which the importance of human activity goes unacknowledged. Balthasar
interprets the kenotic motif in terms of an active obedience: “This co-operation can no
longer remain at the level of indifference in the sense of merely letting things happen; no,
the particular will of God, which is to be actively grasped and carried out, must also be
actively pursued. For the Rhineland mystics, abandonment came in at the end.”36 In this
quotation Balthasar shows a legitimate concern on the placement of the abandonment.
What he means is that by placing abandonment at the end, two consequences result. The
beginning of the spiritual journey harbors an undercurrent of autonomy and technique.
Second, abandonment at the end without any connection to the active process of
spirituality results in a passive eternal rest. Both of these consequences are highly
problematic for Balthasar as I will show later.
Absorption’s equally damaging opposite is what I will call autonomy: the belief
that human agency is solely realized in individual action and rational choice.37 The
individual is seen as the arbiter of meaning. What is so distasteful to Balthasar about this
perspective is that it places the emphasis on human activity to the exclusion of divine
revelation and promotes violence and competition among humanity.
The term ‘autonomy’ can also be misleading. In Theo-Drama II, Balthasar
stridently declares that human freedom (he calls it “finite” freedom) is “a presupposition
35
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for the whole biblical drama . . . that takes place between God and mankind.”38 What
Balthasar cautions against is a human autonomy that rejects the path of self-giving love in
exchange for self-realization: “Thus a man may decide that, for the purposes of selfrealization, the whole area must remain completely open (so that, if there were a
preexistent and fully realized absolute freedom, the path of finite freedom would only be
distorted and its course frustrated)” (italics mine).39 Because of what we know of
Balthasar’s internal logic and his remedy for original sin, it may not come as a surprise to
see that he believes the ultimate result of the autonomy model of self-actualization is
rejection of God’s invitation, it is a “No” to God, which inevitably ends in selfannihilation. “Man responds to this provocation [in the post-Christian situation] by
attempting to manufacture the kingdom of God on earth, with increasing means and
methods of power; logically this power that resists the powerlessness of the Cross is
bound to destroy itself, for it bears the principle of self-annihilation within it by saying
No to the claim of Christ.”40 The power and autonomy offered by post-Christian sources
lead not to self-fulfillment but to destruction.
In Balthasar’s reading of history, there are many ups and downs in Christian
theology. Scholasticism and the modern period have brought about a refreshing and
important emphasis on the importance of individuality and the “meaning and
consciousness of Christian mission.”41 The uniqueness of each person comes to the fore.
Yet, there is a danger that this might morph into a more radical approach where the
38
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individual is given sole authority and free reign. There is a sliding scale in Balthasar’s
estimation on the autonomy principle and various thinker’s relation to it.42
Take, for example, Balthasar’s infamous criticisms of Karl Rahner. Balthasar and
Rahner have many commonalities, and Balthasar showed appreciation for some aspects
of Rahner’s work, but ultimately he worried that Rahner’s Christian convictions are
overshadowed by his ideas from German Idealism. Fergus Kerr explains:
It is always a good question to ask what a philosopher fears. Von Balthasar’s
highly implausible claim that the success of Christianity has wiped out all other
forms of religion and metaphysics is tied up with his suspicions of Karl Rahner’s
theology.” He fears that the deity of natural religion is “the kind of God whom
now, in the post-Christian age, modern transcendental theology would like to
reinstate.”43
Balthasar equates German idealism with the newest version of a natural religion. 44 Karen
Kilby observes that it is precisely this point at which Balthasar gives his “fiercest
criticisms of Rahner” and points to the clear implications for the kenotic motif:
The context of these criticisms, that is to say, is the larger discussion of Christian
witness (martyrdom), on the one hand, versus ‘the System’ (the system of German
Idealism), on the other. Christians who want to be modern, to adapt to the times,
to be able to speak to their fellow human beings in a language that can be
understood, will be tempted to adopt the System in some form; but the cost,
Balthasar maintains, will be the loss of martyrdom, of genuine witness, of genuine
Christianity.45
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So what Kerr calls Balthasar’s “fear” and what Kilby calls “his fiercest criticism” is the
encroachment of a natural religious system that displaces kenosis (martyrdom) from the
central meaning of the Christian faith. This supports the argument of this dissertation in
the following ways. First, it confirms that Balthasar values the motif of kenosis (here
expressed in terms of the disciples emulation of Jesus’s emptying in his death). Second it
reiterates the negative role that autonomy plays in the system of natural pathways to God
(here expressed through his concerns about German idealism and Rahner’s approach).
And finally, it reinforces the point made about Balthasar’s concern for system, because
systems of thought are always designed and initiated by humanity in order to
comprehend. Balthasar’s goal is not comprehension but the expression of the form of
Christ and the resultant worship.
Many critics of the kenotic motif see freedom, like bread and water and shelter,
as limited resources, and self-realization as, on some level a Darwinian competition for
survival in which individuals are pitted against each other to grasp at what is needed for
freedom and flourishing. From their perspective, other human forces or divine forces are
obstacles to the individual’s self-realization. And in this worldview, the definitions of
freedom and agency are reduced to force, power, and strength.46 For Balthasar “this
means that every positive, loving relationship to one’s fellow man, who represents an
46
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attack on my freedom, is fundamentally and finally destroyed. Freedom and betrayal go
together.”47 What starts out as a laudable attempt to preserve individuality and freedom
ends up destroying the very thing it sought to protect. “Whenever the self tries to prescind
from its rootedness in God and establish its own autonomy, it is attempting to consolidate
its freedom; it is attempting to seize power.48
Balthasar believes that when the desire is divorced from the good and clothed in
“a hegemony of instrumental rationality” it becomes one of the most audacious and
honest expressions of evil, and, following Heidegger, he sees nothing surprising of the
progression from Descartes and Kant’s epistemology to the “absolute will to power in
Nietzsche.”49 And this will to power and the evil behind it is not merely rhetorical or
ideological violence but literal violence:
Within the confines of the world, the desiderium visionis cannot be satisfied
hence, if it does not seek its peace in God, it gives rise to all the familiar forms of
fanaticism and anarchism, and the terrorism . . . the classical-romantic Faust
figures are followed by the political Fausts of our century: thus as a clear
realization that man, as constituted, can provide no hope of ultimate satisfaction,
we have Nietzche’s Superman. And everywhere, beside Faust, beside Hegel,
Marx, Lenin, Stalin, beside Zarathustra and Hitler, we discern the shadow of a
demon, insinuating that all that exists ‘deserves to be destroyed.’50
The autonomy principle must embrace coercion and violence to achieve its ends. The
good of human flourishing cannot come out of such a view of the world.
Conclusion
In summary, absorption and autonomy share a common cause: original sin. Yet,
there are some main differences, especially in relation to kenosis as a practice. The
47
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absorption approach is a choice to rebel against creaturely difference by abolishing the
creature through various sacrificial and ascetic practices. The autonomy approach allows
the self (at least the rational piece) to come into its own but the relationship to the divine
is downplayed or used as a justification for competition and oppression of freedom. The
absorption model distorts the kenosis motif; the autonomy model attempts to obliterate it.
For Balthasar, engagement with kenosis must take neither of these approaches. Loving
relations with others and openness to the Divine are fundamental aspects of kenotic
practice that are denied by the autonomy approach’s sole focus on the self.
Yet, merely acknowledging the kenotic nature of reality and exercising it in
spirituality cannot be the answer either. It cannot be a spiritual technique in which the
finitude of the person is transcended or considered unimportant. It cannot be an ethical
principle devoid of relational categories that is forced upon the individual to shape their
actions. It cannot be an ontological principle in which the “I” of the human person is
either passively relinquished into the Abyss of the Absolute or a process of knowledge
that leads to the realization that the “I” is an illusion in the first place. The remaining
chapters will examine how Balthasar’s theology is an attempt to create a metaphysical
and spiritual framework, grounded in the kenosis motif that supports a vision of human
agency that respects creaturehood and offers freedom while situating the self within a
web of relationships. This definition will move beyond concepts of superficial selfrealization or an abstract ethical ideal, “for neither fantasy nor concept can express the
true object of man’s real longing. Nor can he know this of himself; for only God can
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reveal it to him.”51 God, not human agency, will be the focus of the first two chapters. It
is fundamental to Balthasar that the nature of humanity finds meaning not only from
natural sciences, psychology, and philosophy, but from the revealed character of God in
the Scriptures and in the Church. This is why it will be absolutely crucial to establish the
character of God and his intentions with his creatures from the very beginning.
The second chapter will examine the Incarnation. The third chapter will relate the
kenotic theme to the trinitarian life. The fourth chapter will discuss the anthropology/
spirituality that develop out of Balthasar’s reading of the Trinity and the Incarnation.
Chapter Five will briefly recapitulate my argument and conclude with an assessment of
Balthasar’s work.
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CHAPTER TWO
KENOSIS, INCARNATION AND SALVATION
The introductory chapter described the parameters of kenosis in Balthasar’s
theology by examining his criticisms of various worldviews. He rejects all of these
worldviews because they do not take into account the kenotic reality of the divine-human
relationship. Original sin ruptured the kenotic activity between God and humanity so that
before Christ, even the most sincere and well-intentioned religious systems were doomed
to fail:
It was essential that Christ, in his Incarnation, should bring the fullness of heaven
to earth . . . . Otherwise the contemplation of God would only have been possible
in the forms of negative apophatic mysticism, which seeks to encounter God
beyond all that is of the world, as the Wholly Other, who can be neither
conceived, nor beheld, nor comprehended. Such a view, inevitably, does a great
injustice to the world and our fellow creatures.52

Because of original sin, the true self is obscured, marred, and damaged. The Incarnation
and the ensuing process of salvation and spirituality begin transformation and recovery of
the true self, and thus, an avenue for attaining unprecedented transformative agency.
Yet it is not only other worldviews, but also Christian theology that is deficient.
Theologians have failed to recognize and articulate the transformative relation between
the creature and God that is of primary importance to Balthasar. His solution to some of
these past theological failings is his Theo-drama. As Aiden Nichols remarks:
What all this means for Balthasar is that we must recognise the priority of theodrama over theology. Unless theo-drama is accorded primacy, the varieties of
contemporary theology Balthasar analysed in his Prolegomena simply cannot find
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that central point of convergence which they need. The centre is not to be defined
conceptually, however, as in a theological super-system where the different
competing systematic theologies might be integrated at the level of ideas.53
This is a fundamental shift from a theology of ideas to a theology of relationships. One of
the first things to note about Balthasar’s discussion of the Incarnation is that it is not
solely a matter of discovering the historical Jesus. Balthasar starts his inquiry with the
sense that Jesus is not strictly a historical person, spoken about in the past tense and
accessible only through written historical accounts. Instead Jesus is alive and active
within the Church and the scriptures. He avoids treating Jesus (and scripture for that
matter) as a “quest” in which the truth of Jesus is found through historical-critical
methods. For Balthasar it would be more appropriate to say that the Christian’s quest
starts after we encounter Jesus through divine initiative.
In this theo-dramatic framework the rational, abstract constructs of philosophy or
the portraits of Jesus hobbled together from historical sources can never aptly express the
depth of the drama in the Incarnation. Only drama can adequately frame the Christian
view of the divine and the human relationship: “now we must allow the encountering
reality to speak in its own tongue or, rather, let ourselves be drawn into its dramatic
arena. For God’s revelation is not an object to be looked at; it is his action in and upon
the world, and the world can only respond, and hence ‘understand, through action on its
part.”54 It is crucial to remember that for Balthasar, theology is participatory and active
because the Incarnation and salvation of humanity is a saving action.
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Balthasar’s theology follows the contours of this theo-dramatic relationship.
Prima facie, Trinitarian reflection (and its cosmic implications) seems to offer the most
comprehensive vantage point from which to examine themes of kenosis. However,
human knowledge of the Trinitarian matrix is only established a posteriori from the event
of the Incarnation. The action of God in the Incarnation, not a speculation on the Trinity,
is the starting point for Balthasar’s enterprise. His answer to the discordant features of
human attempts at transcendence is to emphasize God’s initiative in the Incarnation
rather than start with the implications for ontology of a triune God. I will follow
Balthasar’s own viewpoint that we only know of the triune God through the Incarnation
of the Son. In addition, Balthasar insists that Christ is also the litmus test for an authentic
humanity. Jesus is not simply an ideal life into which human beings must wedge
themselves into a one-size-fits-all christological pattern. Jesus provides a vision of
humanity “that is worthwhile, in which we need not essentially renounce any genuinely
human function.”55 Paradoxically, in the Incarnation, for the first time the “true God”
simultaneously “reveals to us the image of true man.”56
This chapter will first situate Balthasar’s unique approach to the Incarnation by a
brief discussion of the often used terms “high and low Christology,” as well as examining
two proposed narratives of the history of kenosis. Second, I will discuss how Balthasar’s
theo-dramatic approach creates an especially fruitful conceptual garden for the motif of
kenosis to blossom. Third, I will describe Balthasar’s conception of the motive within

55

Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Asceticism,” Communio 27, no. 1 (2000): 25-26.
Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics: Volume I: Seeing the
Form, trans. Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982), 562. In other words, this
chapter will provide the basis for the further explorations into trinitarian kenotic activity and in tracing
human kenotic activity in the next chapters. Hereafter cited as GL 1.
56

27
God, for the Incarnation. Fourth, I will explore Balthasar’s vision of the salvific action of
Jesus involving five biblical metaphors. Within these metaphors, I will highlight their
relation to kenosis as well as other features of Balthasar’s Christology.
Balthasar’s Approach to the Incarnation and the History of Kenosis
I would like to elaborate now on how Balthasar’s Christology might set him apart
from other Christian thinkers. It has become a pedagogical trope to describe christologies
as either “high” or “low” or “from above” and “from below.” While the use of these
terms can be vague, I will use Oliver Crisp’s recent work to lend some clarity to where
Balthasar might fall in this spectrum.57 First, it is important to note that, for Crisp, a high
Christology is not completely synonymous with a Christology from above, nor a low
Christology the same thing as a Christology from below. The high/low dichotomy refers
to the scale of the divine and human element of Jesus while the “above” and “below”
terms are related to methodological approaches to Christology. And, for Crisp, none of
these categories can be claimed as completely orthodox. According to Crisp, a high
Christology is defined as one “according to which Christ is (minimally) more than
human”58 and a low Christology as one in “which Christ is (minimally) fully and merely
human.”59 This definition of high Christology is not necessarily and indicator of
orthodoxy. In fact, Crisp points out that some heresies, such as Arianism and Docetism fit
within this definition.60 In definition a “low” Christology can either affirm the fullness of
the human person of Jesus Christ (as any orthodox position would hold) or can extend
their definition to mean that Jesus was merely human and nothing else.
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The other two categories used to classify christological approaches are
Christology from above and from below. These indicate an emphasis on how one views
the source materials. A Christology from above “begins with the data of divine revelation
contained in, or generated by Scripture and/or the propositions of Catholic creeds and
confessional statements and uses these data to formulation Christological statements.”61
The christological approach “from below” is “any method in Christology that beings with
the data of historical document that refer to Christ including the new Testament and other
extra-biblical materials, and uses these data to formulate christological statements.”62
So, how much to these definitions help further this christological conversation?
And furthermore, how do they aid in expressing Balthasar’s own positions? In brief,
Balthasar utilizes a combination of these approaches and does add one element. Balthasar
definitely has a strong sense that Jesus is the divine Son, and thus holds to a high
Christology. Yet, when it comes to methodological considerations, Balthasar is more
complex. He does insist on the priority of divine revelation and is a faithful adherent to
the creeds. He is suspicious of the approach from below, viewing it as a nascent attempt
to fashion a Christology from a set of materialistic suppositions. However, Balthasar
himself employs a Christology from below approach in Theo-Drama and recognizes its
value.63
One additional aspect of Balthasar’s theology that Crisp’s book doesn’t seem to
account for is the experience and texts of the saints. For Balthasar, phenomena in these
lives are christologically revelatory. In some ways this approach could be called “from
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above” in that these lives are judged by the creeds, church, and revelation. But in another
way, these are human lives and writings, existing in historical context and they have often
been marginalized doctrinally, even by the church itself. This aspect of Balthasar’s
theology will be taken up in Chapter Four.
Balthasar holds the truths of the high and low christologies together in a unique
way that Mark McIntosh has brought attention to in his aptly titled book, Christology
Within. Instead of approaching Christology solely from above or below, McIntosh argues
that Balthasar searches out the connection between a Chalcedonian doctrine and the
“spirit” of the Ignatian model of mystical encounter,64 in an attempt to avoid some of the
“metaphysical discomfort” of the high Christology approach.65 McIntosh notes that
metaphysical discomfort is mitigated by emphasizing Jesus’s actions as the connection
point between the divine and human in Jesus. The activities of Jesus have usually been
the domain of christologies of the low sort, in which they are discussed as human actions
designed to teach or enlighten. However, since Balthasar sees in the activity of Jesus a
union in mission with the divine, he sees it more than merely a moralizing lesson and at
the same time, Balthasar also refuses to accept any high Christology that would threaten
the understanding that Jesus’s actions are anything other than perfectly human.66 This is a
key piece that is noted by McIntosh:
Where Chalcedon speaks of a union of divine and human essences in Christ, von
Balthasar will speak of union of divine and human activity in Christ. He does this
by radicalizing a suggestion that Maximus the Confessor had drawn from
trinitarian theology and applied to christology. Maximus speaks of how the
eternal Son possesses the divine essence according to his particular mode of
existence as the Son. So Christ’s humanity, while remaining perfectly human in
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its essence, is lived out according to that particular pattern of life or mode of
existence which is the perfect enactment in human terms of the Son’s eternal
mode of existence. Von Balthasar adopts this christological insight
wholeheartedly, for it allows him to speak of the divine in Christ precisely in
terms of the very human pattern and activity of Jesus’ life. This becomes almost
an organic impulse in von Balthasar’s christology.67
This “organic impulse” is important because it cultivates a uniquely fertile moment for
kenosis in the history of Christian thought. The kenosis motif is allowed to operate in
other theological areas usually closed off to its influence. To more fully understand this
fertile moment, I will now discuss the narrative of kenosis that is offered.
Discussions of kenosis in theology almost always fall exclusively under the rubric
of Christology. It seems prudent then, in order to support my claim that Balthasar’s
theology offers a more comprehensive and unique view of kenosis to elaborate on that
history within the christological context of this chapter.68 To begin with kenosis is to
begin with Philippians 2:4-11 (ESV version):
Let each of you look not only to his own interests, but also to the interests of
others.5 Have this mind among yourselves, which is yours in Christ Jesus,6 who,
though he was in the form of God, did not count equality with God a thing to be
grasped,7 but emptied himself, by taking the form of a servant, being born in the
likeness of men.8 And being found in human form, he humbled himself by
becoming obedient to the point of death, even death on a cross.9 Therefore God
has highly exalted him and bestowed on him the name that is above every
name,10 so that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, in heaven and on
earth and under the earth,11 and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to
the glory of God the Father.
This passage is one of the rare places that the word kenosis actually appears in Scripture.
It has spawned numerous interpretations running the gamut from a decisive change in

67

Ibid., 5.
This dissertation will utilize two main sources for this narrative of kenosis: Dawe, The Form of
a Servant: A Historical Analysis of the Kenotic Motif. The other source is the more recent book by David
Brown, Divine Humanity.
68

31
God’s being to an ethical and hymnic metaphor for God’s action.69 Yet as David Brown
argues, the importance of this passage can be overblown. A full understanding of kenosis
“must stand or fall on the best interpretation of the New Testament as a whole . . .”70
The theologians of the patristic era debated some significant and substantive
parameters around the doctrine of the Incarnation. Due to cultural context, the newness of
the faith, and political influences, one of the central concerns was to describe how Jesus
became both God and man. While these debates happened with reference to metaphysical
concepts, the underlying concern was always soteriological. What did it mean for
humanity if Jesus was the highest, first-born creature rather than God’s very Son?
According to most interpreters of the history of kenosis, the early church was
focused on creating a creed that prevented specific interpretations of Arian views and this
prevented them from detaching themselves from the corrupting influence of Hellenistic
philosophy. These views represented a perceived threat to the divinity of Jesus. In
addition to the Arian family of theological perspectives, the influence of Gnostic beliefs
“ascribed to the Logos only an apparent body (which excluded a Kenosis)” which also
caused difficulties for the early church as it set out to elaborate its beliefs.71 So while the
Fathers were able to affirm a real descent and a real humiliation in the Incarnation, David
Brown reiterates that they were “closed off by the taking up of anti-heretical position,
whether in defence of the unchangedness of the form of God, and so of the Son’s glory
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even during his Kenosis, or of the unchangeability of God in general.”72 And Donald
Dawe believes that the Arian controversies so controlled the interpretation of Philippians
2 that it skewed that interpretation away from acknowledging a possible change in God.73
According to the narrative provided by these authors, the idea of kenosis could
gain little traction in this period because of this doctrine of immutability. But that
narrative is skewed. Balthasar’s disagreement with the narratives of kenosis that Dawe
and Brown provide is that they are operating within the unfortunate paradigm of Adolf
Harnack: they reject all versions of immutability as mutually exclusive with the kenotic
motif, ignoring the connection between the biblical version of apatheia and its
connection to kenotic Christology.
Both authors assume that kenosis by definition is tied to an emptying in some
capacity of divine attributes and thus excludes the possibility of divine immutability.74
What does this mean for Balthasar? Balthasar is no blind adopter of patristic or medieval
thought and he diverges from it in many ways,75 but as Edward Oakes remarks, Balthasar
perceived the “essentially biblical presuppositions that operate within all of the Church
Fathers, transforming—however unconsciously, in many cases—the philosophy they
inherited.”76 Essentially, Balthasar believed that the biblical center of the mystical
tradition was present in antiquity in a way that Harnack and his followers were unable to
accept:
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The technique of apatheia in antiquity for self-salvation from the world
becomes, in the Christian age, the ascetic expansion of the heart and its
preparation in order that it should flow into an unlimited readiness to love.
. . . From Augustine via Benedict to Francis and Ignatius, this remains the
primal truth which, though unchanging in its essence, is constantly
illumined in new ways.77
These authors have generally appropriated Harnack’s thesis that rampant
Hellenism caused a homogenous doctrinal formulation of God’s immutability that was
taken not from biblical revelation but from Greek philosophy. As Lewis Ayres has argued
regarding the fourth century, the problem is that the message scholars receive is that the
historical-critical method is the sophisticated way of reading scripture and that the
patristic method is the naive way of reading scripture. When this presupposition coupled
with the general dismay fostered by Harnack’s influence at the perceived philosophical
and ascetic corruptions of the gospel holds sway, it fosters a superficial engagement not
only with patristic writers but medieval ones as well that leads to misinterpretations of
these writers’ theologies.
Once Dawe’s and Brown’s narratives move out of the patristic era, they focus
most of their energies on the creative developments that occurred in the nineteenth
century in German and English circles, which were characterized by the willingness to
dispense with notions of immutability. However, the problem with these later
developments in kenotic thought, according to Balthasar, is that early Lutheran
theologians were hampered by a viewing of the “divine attributes in an Old Testament
fashion.”78
The previous discussions of high and low Christology and the account of the
history of kenosis offer a sort of beginning or prolegomena for Balthasar’s doctrine of the
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Incarnation and kenosis. They are both attempts at differentiating Balthasar’s approach
conceptually and historically in order to make the case that, for Balthasar, the Incarnation
is of the utmost importance. Indeed it is the singular happening in all of reality that
impacts all other facets of life and living. Balthasar’s fascinating linkage of the
Incarnation with kenosis and the implications he draws from it is expressed with
wonderful creativity and courage.
Since the Incarnation is a response to sin and evil, Jesus Christ is predominantly a
savior. Balthasar’s description of Christology includes the work that Jesus does to secure
our salvation. If it is true that salvation is the goal of the Incarnation, for Balthasar, then it
can also be said that the kenosis is the primary descriptor of the Incarnation. As Aidan
Nichols notes, that for Balthasar it is “the kenosis of divine love, not the aussumptio of
the human nature, is the primary message of the Incarnation.”79 This section will describe
in more general terms what the doctrine of the Incarnation means for Balthasar and how
that doctrine uses kenosis in relation to various aspects of the drama of salvation using
five biblical motifs.
The Five Biblical Motifs of Salvation
Balthasar covers five biblical motifs, or key features of salvation in the fourth
volume of the Theo-Drama. While he believes these five motifs cannot be assimilated
into a closed system, it will become evident through this exposition that they all contain
the element of kenosis. Balthasar’s vision of salvation is affected through stages of
kenotic activity and that human agency is one of the outcomes of this kenotic activity.
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Balthasar believes the “quintessence of Scripture” can be encapsulated in the following
five motifs:
(1) The Son gives himself, through God the Father, for the world’s salvation. (2)
The Sinless One “changes places” with sinners. While, in principle, the Church
Fathers understand this in a radical sense, it is only in the modern variation of the
theories of representation that the consequences are fully drawn out. (3) Man is
thus set free (ransomed, redeemed, released). (4) More than this, however, he is
initiated into the divine life of the Trinity. (5) Consequently, the whole process is
shown to be the result of an initiative on the part of divine love.80
This section will expound on these motifs, noting how each one relates to the person of
Jesus and the motif of kenosis.
The first motif contemplates the Son’s self-gift through the Father to the world.
This motif holds within it the mysteries of the trinitarian life, creation, and covenant. It is
the site of the original kenosis in which we glimpse the relationship between the Persons
of the Trinity that form the backdrop for the Incarnation.81 The Incarnation is directed in
two places: toward the Father and for the world. The Son offers himself up to the Father
from all eternity, in the form of willing self-gift, fully in service of the Father.82 The
Incarnation is an extension of this eternal “eucharistic attitude” of the Son.83 “Covenant
and creation are not only rendered possible by the son’s ‘eucharistic’ response to the
Father: they are ‘surpassed by it, since both of them can only become reality within the
embrace of the Son’s response.”84 So all of creation, covenant, and Incarnation reveal the
depth of the love between the persons of the Trinity and that each were involved in the
salvation of the world.
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This motif of Jesus’s giving up of self for the world’s salvation is precisely the
movement of divine kenotic love toward humanity, first apprehended by Christianity that
forms the basis for all other forms of kenotic activity. It is this kenotic love that solves the
terrible effects of sin and restores our relationship with God by contradicting all prior
human attempts at reaching salvation:
The primary reality is, not man’s movement from below up to the absolute, in
order, if possible, to disappear in it, but rather, as Ignatius of Loyola emphatically
repeats, the movement de arriba, coming down from above, in which God
empties himself out in order to fill man up with his loving self-expropriation.85
The Incarnation is the central answer to human sin, not because of the assumption of
human flesh to divinize it, but because it reveals divine love for creaturely finitude. It is
God’s pronouncement, once again, that creation is good. It is a healing and restoration of
human finitude.
In sum, this first motif represents three levels of kenosis. The timeless gift of
divinity that the Father gives to the Son is the first. The reason for the Son’s thankfulness
toward the Father is because the Father fully surrendered all of his divine life to the Son.
The second level of kenosis is the Son’s gift back to the Father.86 Finally, the third level
of kenotic activity is the Father and Son giving themselves to the world. And all of this is
to reveal God’s love for the created order and his restoration of that order through
kenosis, not through coercive power.
It is through the third level of kenosis that Balthasar’s theology of mission enters
into the drama. It is Balthasar’s unique concept of mission [sendung] that provides the
unity of activity between the divine and human Jesus that he sees in the Incarnation.
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Mission is at the living center of Balthasar’s action-oriented Christology. Mission is a
sending. As Balthasar quips, “No one can give himself a mission.”87 Jesus places his
identity within the external mission given him by the Father and in so doing grows and
develops his sense of agency. Mission is essential to the development of personhood. In
fact it is constitutive of personhood.88 This means that for Jesus, his personhood was
something that was always his, yet developed as he followed his mission.89
The second motif, this exchange with sinners, is a classic expression of the
biblical and patristic sources on salvation.90 This motif emphasizes the sacrificial and
substitutionary aspects of salvation. Jesus takes on our sins and our punishment of death,
and we receive the merits of his life and work. This exchange indicates a kenotic
movement into two aspects:
the first is ordered more to the event of Good Friday,the second more to that of
Holy Saturday. In the suffering of the living Jesus, there is a readiness to drink the
‘chalice of wrath,’ that is, to let the whole power of sin surge over him. . . . Sin’s
impatience, as the sum of all world-historical sinful impatience against God, is
finally exhausted in comparison to the patience of the Son of God. His patience
undergirds sin and lifts it off its hinges. Of course: it is not quantities that stand
here as rivals over against each other but qualities. The quality of the loving
obedience of the Son toward the Father . . . is not to be compared with the quality
of the hate that surges over him.91
The exchange that takes place on Good Friday is an active and patient bearing of sin.
Then within Holy Saturday, Jesus solidifies “his solidarity in nontime with those who
have been lost to God. For these people, their choice is definitive, the choice whereby
they have chosen their “I” instead of God’s selfless love.”92 Balthasar characterizes hell
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as a person’s choice to serve his or her own “I” over God’s offering of himself. Yet even
here, in this seemingly final choice, “the Son descends; but now he is no longer acting in
any way but from the Cross is instead robbing every power and initiative by being the
Purely Available One, the Obedient One . . . the absolutely cadaver-like obedience . . . He
is dead with the dead (but out of a final love).”93 This obedience of Jesus and his
exchange with sinners reaches its full dramatic tension in Hell where Jesus’s identity has
wholly identified with the damned.
Unlike the mainstream triumphalist approach, which envisions the descent into
hell as a “‘chaining’ and ‘robbing’ of the power of death-Satan-Hades, thereby
interpreting it as a victorious journey”94 and treats the descent under the third motif of
liberation as Jesus releasing the captives, Balthasar places it here, within the exchange of
places, due to the emphasis that he gives to kenotic themes. In what is usually interpreted
as powerful—overcoming the Devil—Balthasar treats as a divestment of power that
overcomes evil through defenselessness and patience.95 This exchange is understood as
going into the experiences of a damned person, which would be death and hell—total
alienation and resignation. It is this exchange in which Balthasar’s logic of kenosis in the
order of salvation reaches its extreme and “the omnipotent powerlessness of God’s love
shines forth in the mystery of darkness and alienation between God and the sin-bearing
Son; this is where Christ ‘represents’ us, takes our place: what is ‘experienced’ is the
opposite of what the facts indicate.”96
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The third motif of salvation is the release of humanity from sin. For Balthasar,
human sin is primarily an attempt to grasp freedom and power apart from God. Thus,
humanity,
in seeking to arrogate this power [divine power] to itself, finite freedom does two
things: it separates power from self-giving goodness, and it sets itself up against
the absolute good-thereby incurring the judgment of the latter. Judgment reveals
that the usurped power is actually God’s power over the usurpers. The one who
attempts to seize absolute power is overwhelmed by it; he has no defense against
it. Seeking ‘liberation’ through total autonomy, he is so fettered by it (for total
autonomy belongs to God) that release can only come from God.97
The liberation that God offers humanity is from the cycle of power and grasping for
autonomy. Salvation opens up the kenotic mode of life to humanity, inviting it to live in a
way that disconnects human freedom from the mechanics of power struggles and
embrace a freedom constituted by self-giving, loving relationships. In Jesus, who
embraces self-emptying love, we are shown another way of acting that will grant us true
liberation.
But this was not shown merely through teaching or example alone, but through the
divine activity of the Incarnation, death and resurrection of Jesus. Without these events,
the power of death would not be broken: “only in absolute weakness does God want to
give to each freedom created by him the gift of a love that breaks out of every dungeon
and dissolves every constriction.”98
In the Garden of Gethsemane, for example, Jesus empties himself of his own
wishes in favor of accepting the mission granted to him. Inherent within this mission is
the refusal of divine force as the solution to the dilemma of sin. Instead the solution
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involves “on the one hand, obedience to the Father (John 18, 11), and, on the other, a
decision in favour of defencelessness–renunciation of the ‘twelve legions of Angels
(Matthew 26, 53) countermanding the attempt to defend him (Luke 22, 51 and parallels)
and the instruction to Judas, ‘Do your business.’”99 To defeat evil Balthasar argues that
Jesus chooses obedience and defenseless love, rather than making use of force.
The element of obedience has double significance, first for the life of Jesus in
refusing violence even in the face of suffering and, also, for Balthasar’s understanding of
the journey of human transformation. Balthasar acknowledges that there is a disjunction
and a jarring and painful effort in obedience. However, if sin is indeed an attempt at
grasping autonomy, then obedience is the way to counter the sinful inclinations we find
in our hearts. Balthasar says that, “by the grace of the Lord, renunciation leads the apostle
not only to a new and promising fullness of earthly as well as heavenly gifts . . . and to
the freedom of truth . . . and of Christ . . ., but also to an explicit sharing in the
fruitfulness of the Lord’s redemptive sacrifice. . . . Only in the eyes of the world are the
renunciations of Christendom something negative.”100 Balthasar claims both an
immediate and eternal benefit from the salvation wrought by Christ. The way of attaining
salvation is obedience.
Jesus’ “decision in favour of defenselessness” is an active, not passive choice in
how respond to evil. Balthasar argues that
for Jesus what mattered was not a form of self-perfection or a means of gaining
knowledge. Rather, Jesus’ intention was to amortize all attacks of violence in the
spiritual field, alchemizing them in the very arena that is the instrument of evil.
For Jesus, evil is not only psychologically exhausted of its power when we refuse
to resist it, but, more crucially, it is taken captive in its very essence.”101
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Jesus’s kenosis, instead of being wholly resigned and passive, is courageous and
engaging. It is the very mechanism by which liberation is achieved for humanity.
This element of defenselessness is not only related to the concrete obedience
described above, but it speaks as a condemnation of any principle, way of life, or
spirituality that would create coercion and competition in the service of autonomy. It is a
cosmic rejection of violence and coercion. For Balthasar, not only does Jesus affect
salvation but he discloses the form of creaturely life and fulfillment.102 Human
flourishing cannot be achieved through violence. The hard-won liberation for the created
order is achieved not through the use of power but in the subversion of it. Balthasar sees
autonomous power has a threat to harmonious relationships. Even God, who has
autonomous power, operates in the kenotic way of vulnerable self-offering. The
constrictive search for autonomy and its pernicious effects on humanity are broken by
Jesus through kenosis, and we are offered true freedom in proper relation with the
Creator. That invitation to proper relation is discussed in the fourth motif.
The fourth motif is the invitation to respond to the freedom from sin, won by
Christ when he stepped into the life of the divine Trinity. In this motif, Balthasar
transitions from ransomed individuals saved from death and the futile search for
autonomy, to the incorporation of the Christian into Christ’s life. For Balthasar, this
immersion into the Cross, death, and Resurrection and mission of Jesus is the true
pathway to the maximization of human agency.
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The work of Jesus was to bear up within himself all opposition to God, allowing it
to exist within the infinite distance between the persons of the Trinity. This spatial
analogy is meant to remind us of the distance, qualitatively speaking, that Christ went in
Hell. He went there not only to identify with sinners but also to establish a place for
sinners, in their rejection of God, to be encompassed within God’s own being. Because
God is triune, this establishment has precedent within the self-emptying relations of God.
We must remember that the creature’s No, its wanting to be autonomous without
acknowledging its origin, must be located within the Son’s all-embracing yes to
the Father, in the Spirit; it is the refusal to participate in the autonomy with which
the Son is endowed. This negation, however, is restriction: it is the refusal to
follow truth to the very end . . . . For the Son, following the truth to the end means
making a fitting response to the Father’s total gift of himself by freely and
thankfully allowing himself to be poured forth by the Father, a response that is
made in absolute spontaneity and in absolute ‘obedience’ to the Father (and
‘obedience here means the readiness to respond and correspond to the Father) . . .
The creature’s No is merely a twisted knot within the Son’s pouring-forth; it is
left behind by the current of love.103
So the very rejection of Jesus and the kind of freedom that he offers is dealt with by God
through the divine act of self-emptying, defenseless, absolute love, so that even in our
most resistant state we are still taken up, in a manner of speaking, into to the patterns of
the triune life.
Consequently, we are invited to let go of our resistance to God and enter into the
autonomy of the Son in order to find our true personhood. It is this inclusive nature of
Christ that is key to salvation. The follower of Christ “is given a unique participation in
the Son’s uniqueness,” resulting in the “inexhaustible multiplication of what is once-forall and unique; thus it also permits each individual freedom to fulfill itself in an utterly
distinct manner within the realm of infinite freedom.”104 This movement from
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individuality to personhood will be discussed further in chapter five, but let me briefly
state that the pattern that Balthasar envisions arising from these biblical motifs is one of
human agency established through the patterns of self-giving. The autonomy end of the
continuum, on the one hand, eradicates self-giving because it is a threat. The absorption
approach, on the other, turns self-giving into self-annihilation. Both attempts do not
successfully establish human agency but constrict it and do violence to it.
The fifth motif is the most comprehensive, identifying divine love as the thing that
initiates all of God’s movement toward creation. The first key feature of this motif is that
it is a triune God who loves. By keeping this at the forefront, we can refute the charge
that Christianity believes in an abusive divine Father. The fifth motif balances all the
other soteriological motifs, providing a clear defense against the argument that the Cross
is “divine child abuse” being “paraded as salvific and the child who suffers ‘without even
raising a voice’ is lauded as the hope of the world.”105 While it is true that Balthasar does
indeed emphasize the Cross,106 it is far more accurate to say that the controlling concept
is the sheer unanticipated course that divine love took in order to display love to his
creatures:
Every “risk” on God’s part is undergirded by, and enabled by, the power-less
power of the divine self-giving. We cannot say that the Father is involved in ‘risk’
by allowing his Son to go to the Cross, as if only then could he be sure of the
earnestness of the son’s indebtedness and gratitude. However, if we ask whether
there is suffering in God the answer is this: there is something in God that can
develop into suffering. This suffering occurs when the recklessness with which
105

Joanne and Parker Carlson Brown, Rebecca, “For God So Loved the World,” in Violence
Against Women and Children: a Christian Theological Sourcebook, ed. Carol J. Adams and Marie M.
Fortune (New York: Continuum, 1995), 37.
106
One such vivid passage is this one: “This withdrawal on the part of the Father [from the Son]
reaches its acme-brutally, one might say-in the dereliction of the Cross, in which Mary has her share. In this
dereliction, the father gives no word of answer to the Son and his Word, that is, the Son himself, sinks into
the silence of death.” Balthasar, TD 4, 359. Balthasar also argues at length that the Incarnation is ordered to
the Passion. This does not contradict my point. I am merely trying to remind the reader that the cross does
not just originate on the scene. It is the divine love that motivates the Incarnation and Passion.

44
the Father gives away himself (and all that is his) encounters a freedom that,
instead of responding in kind to this magnanimity, changes it into a calculating,
cautious self-preservation.107
Balthasar’s vision of the Incarnation precludes understanding the Cross as “divine child
abuse” because Jesus’s voluntary suffering and self-emptying is always undertaken
within the context of trinitarian love. To think of the kenotic motif as separate from love
is to fundamentally misunderstand it.
The second key feature of this fifth motif is that it is a loving God who effects
salvation. This love is most manifest in the Incarnation itself. He most definitely sees the
Cross and the descent as crucial aspects of God’s plan of salvation, but as parts of this
expression of God’s love for his creation. “The word which God addresses to us is a word
of love: he utters it in a loud, manly voice in broad daylight, almost menacing, causing
man to start out of his dreams and take notice of what he hears—yet it is also a word
whispered in the night, soft and alluring, beyond comprehension, a mystery incredible
even to the strongest faith, which no creature, however long he lives, will fathom.108 The
Incarnation is a waking up to a new reality in which God’s love has found us from a
slumber in which we were unable to comprehend beauty, unable to understand the scope
of our importance to the Creator. The Incarnation is that announcement of love from God
and it is based in this announcement that Jesus’s sufferings must be understood.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this chapter aimed to review Balthasar’s christological and
soteriological perspective. First, I reviewed his understanding of original sin as an
impulse toward absorption or autonomy—both illicit and misguided attempts at securing
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agency for humanity. Then I described briefly Balthasar’s theo-dramatic approach to
Jesus Christ, which emphasizes focusing on the personal activity of Jesus rather than
philosophical or historical investigations and uses that activity as the basis of a
Christology that is neither purely high nor low, neither precisely from above or from
below. Then, after a brief summary of understandings of kenosis in Christian thought, I
intended to elaborate on Balthasar’s elusive and creative style that connects with the
dramatic nature of existence. Finally, I analyzed the five biblical motifs of salvation
through Jesus’s activity that Balthasar claimed represented the fullness of God’s plan of
redemption. These five motifs each demonstrate Balthasar’s ability to to incorporate
kenotic love into narratives of redemption. In a way, kenosis is the common thread
running through these motifs. Each has a kenotic element that enhances and deepens
Balthasar’s understanding of these metaphors.
Indeed, since the Incarnation encompasses every aspect of Christian theology for
Balthasar, his usage of kenosis exhibited here exerts its influence throughout the other
areas of Balthasar’s theology. Balthasar is perhaps one of the first theologians to truly
work out a comprehensive operation of kenotic economy across virtually every major
doctrinal category.

CHAPTER THREE
SUPER-KENOSIS AND THE TRINITARIAN LIFE
One of this dissertation’s primary goals is to link the kenotic motif in Balthasar’s
writings with his conception of human agency. The introductory chapter laid out
Balthasar’s criticisms of alternative worldviews and highlighted his central concern: to
protect creaturely integrity from the absorption and autonomy models of human activity.
These models, while distinct, share an origin in the first sin as recounted in Genesis. To
Balthasar, absorption and autonomy are mistaken attempts to ascend to God. Among the
negative outcomes of these techniques are passive spirituality, attempts to transcend
creaturely finitude (including suffering), and the fomenting of violent competition
between beings for self-fulfillment. These techniques are a rejection of the pattern of
kenotic spirituality connected to interpersonal love that Balthasar proposes.
The second chapter explored Balthasar’s christological employment of kenosis in
the obedience of the Son toward the Father. Jesus’s earthly life was an expression of deep
kenosis, a full self-surrender in love toward the Father and toward humanity. Since
Balthasar sees Jesus’s earthly activity as unified with the Father and the Spirit, one of the
major links between the ideas in chapter two and those of the current chapter is a close
correlation between the activity as expressed in the economy of salvation and the inner
trinitarian life. This chapter will address the multiple images of kenosis Balthasar uses in
trinitarian thought. When read in its proper context, Balthasar’s trinitarian theology has
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two modes that are significantly different from each other and that have different
implications for the kenotic motif.
The first mode of trinitarian discourse is intended to awaken love and gratitude in
those who encounter it through the language of excess. It is this mode that introduces the
language of trinitarian death, super-kenosis, and risk. This mode is intended not to
establish definitive epistemology toward understanding facts about God but to cultivate a
deeper intuition of God’s excess and love. There is a discourse of poverty and wealth,
death and life, kenosis and surplus that circles around the trinitarian mystery. This lends a
distinctive flavor to Balthasar’s trinitarian theology. Rather than focus primarily on the
singular and plural nature of God, it emphasizes the mystical and biblical encounter of
God’s incomprehensible love.
Balthasar’s second mode of trinitarian reflection is more confident and polemical.
This is the ontological mode. Balthasar attempts to infer from trinitarian doctrine an
ontological answer to the philosophical problem of the one and the many. In this mode,
Balthasar’s aim is not to initiate the disciple into the depths of God’s love but to argue
that, because of its trinitarian God whose procession is defined by kenotic love, the
Christian vision of human freedom is superior to other religious and philosophical
traditions.109 In doing so he is offering a solution to the problems he identifies in the
absorption and autonomy approaches: the trinitarian kenotic exchange of persons
maintains a space for all that is non-divine (sin, human creatures, death). This space is
what grounds the possibility of the highest human freedom not in competition with the
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divine. Kenosis functions in this ontological mode as a way to protect personal freedoms,
not only in the Trinity but also as the subtext for all human freedoms. So Balthasar sees
kenosis as the guarantor rather than a stripping away of personal creativity and volition.
Secondary Literature and the Context of Trinitarian Discourse
These modes and implications lead to a diversity of opinions in the secondary
literature. One of the challenges in understanding Balthasar’s trinitarian and kenotic
theology is the problem of metaphorical or analogical language. In the best-case scenario,
Balthasar’s trinitarian theology evokes a paradoxical search for a mystical encounter. In
the worst-case scenario, Balthasar’s speculations are contradictory and dangerous to
human agency and go beyond faithful biblical interpretation.
In the secondary literature there are number of sharp criticisms and confusion
related to Balthasar’s trinitarian theology. Some of these arguments fail to pay attention
to or misconstrue the manner in which this language is employed to support Balthasar’s
larger theological goal. Some critics attempt to downplay the difficulty of Balthasar’s
thought by simply minimizing his more controversial statements. For example, Aristotle
Papanikalou overlooks Balthasar’s more extreme language of suffering and abandonment
in his definition of Balthasarian kenosis, averring that “kenosis, for Balthasar, is not selfsacrifice, but the movements of self-giving toward the other in order to receive the other
that are constitutive of divine and human personhood.”110 This is only a partial
explanation of Balthasar’s concept of kenosis. It also includes self-sacrifice, poverty,
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struggle, abandonment, and death. Papanikolou does not adequately address these darker
realities.111
From a more critical standpoint, Karen Kilby chastises Balthasar for being
“confident and detailed” to a fault in his description of the inner life of the Trinity,
especially in Theo-Drama V.112 Kilby argues that the so-called trinitarian renaissance that
has occurred in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is not a faithful return to tradition
but a hasty reaction to the Enlightenment strictures on epistemology and the resultant
deistic model of God. She terms this theological movement “robust trinitarianism,” and
identifies its trademark as overconfidence in describing (in Balthasar’s case) the inner life
of God.
Kilby’s criticisms and proposed alternatives serve as an example of the ways in
which many scholars misread Balthasar’s trinitarian thought. This section will explicate
some of Kilby’s concerns to illustrate the importance of attending to the following
internal contextual markers of Balthasar’s theological perspective: analogy, negative
theology, biblical revelation, and theology of the saints. Balthasar’s trinitarian theology
actually fits well with Kilby’s proposed alternative, but with one caveat which I will
explain later.
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Kilby is concerned that a robust form of trinitarianism in some cases113 deviates
too far from tradition, creating a climate for idolatry and encouraging a Christian
triumphalism in the marketplace of ideas. She suggests an alternative that she names a
“programme of trinitarian theological modesty.”114 This agenda of modesty is composed
of a series of maxims.115 First, the order of discovery is important: elaboration of
trinitarian doctrine is based on the epiphany that Jesus the Man is also the Christ. Second,
the “theologian who is thinking about the meaning of ‘Father, Son and Spirit’ cannot
forget, say, the narratives from which they . . . first learned to speak of God in these
terms.”116 This means that, regardless of the level of abstraction employed in trinitarian
discourse, one cannot jettison biblical narrative and the personal names of the Father,
Son, and Spirit. And the third and final point is that modesty is a necessary attitude to
employ in relation to explanatory power of trinitarian discourse. As theologians
“believing in the Trinity, we are not so much in possession of a more fully textured
concept of God than a mere Enlightenment deist has, but in fact much less than any deist
in possession of any sort of manageable concept of God at all.”117 Trinitarian discourse
comprises “patterns of affirmation that immediately defeat us.”118 For Kilby, a correct
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trinitarian theology offers not a new avenue of exploration but a confessional boundary
marker that lets the theologian know where to cease his or her speculations.
Putting Balthasar’s trinitarian language in its proper context requires an
examination of four areas: the analogy of being, negative theology, the transition from
biblical revelation of Christ to Trinity, and, briefly, Balthasar’s theology of the saints.
This examination will help clarify some of the problems in the secondary literature and
provide a context for understanding kenosis.
The Analogy of Being
The analogy of being is articulated by the Fourth Lateran council as a way of
governing and guiding our discourse and mystical encounters. The council’s documents
posit a similarity and a greater dissimilarity between the world and God. Balthasar
believed Thomas Aquinas correctly understood analogy as a way of preserving the
ontological distinction between God and humanity.119 Growing out of this conviction, the
pairing of similarity and a greater dissimilarity is an important aspect of Balthasar’s
theological language because it allows us to differentiate between God and creatures,
which are fundamentally necessary for understanding the gospel.120
Balthasar does not, however, rely on an external system of analogy to govern his
language but prefers to envision the oscillation of the similar and dissimilar not in a
philosophical system but in the hypostatic union. Christ is the concrete analogia entis. As
Balthasar reflects, “I have thus tried to construct a theology and philosophy starting from
119
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analogy, not of an abstract Being, but of Being as it is encountered concretely in its
attributes . . . . God appears . . . in Jesus Christ.”121 This foundation in Christ of the
analogia entis is significant because Balthasar essentially fuses philosophical ideas of
language and being to the biblical revelation of Christ. The Incarnate One becomes a
unifier of difference. Jesus’s activity does not fuse the human identity to the divine
identity but instead provides a conduit to real participation in it.122 This real participation
is kenotic, but, based in analogy and difference, presupposes the value of a life sacrificed.
Kenosis is powerful because the self is valuable. Kenosis does not devalue of the
physical; it affirms the physical.
With the idea of analogy, Balthasar’s theology shares Kilby’s commitment to
adherence to the order of revelation instead of to a philosophical or methodological
framework. Balthasar has taken a philosophical theory and brought it into the light of
scripture, employing analogy to ensure that biblical revelation is central to the theological
task. In the case of trinitarian theology specifically, Balthasar employs analogy in a way
that allows him to make positive statements. While Kilby sees this as overconfidence and
hubris, Balthasar sees it as being faithful to the witness of biblical revelation.123

121

Hans Urs von Balthasar, My Work: In Retrospect (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), 115-

116.
122

This is completely crucial to understand anything regarding Balthasar’s use of kenosis. At the
core of the kenosis is the idea that there really is something significant to be emptied. It presupposes a
worth and value in what the creature has to offer God.
123
On this particular area, Balthasar, being influenced by Barth and the Nouvelle Teologie, has
significantly moved Catholic theology toward a commitment to order theology around revelation. Yet
Kilby believes there is more to it than just trying to be faithful to revelation. She sees in Balthasar, a mind
driven to capture the whole and his project an ambitious attempt in the case of his theological aesthetics,
“to weave the New Testament together as whole to bring out its beauty.” This is indeed one way to read
Balthasar, but I remain unconvinced that it is the correct way. Karen Kilby, Balthasar: A (Very) Critical
Introduction, Interventions (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), 55.

53

So how does analogy relate to the kenotic motif? Using this theme of analogy to
expand on the motif of kenosis, it will be a general rule of interpretation that selfemptying will bear within it a similarity and a greater dissimilarity. Human kenosis is
qualitatively different from divine kenosis, and the economic revelation of kenosis in
Jesus is subtly different than kenosis within the trinitarian realm. Analogy partly explains
these differences.
Negative Theology
To claim, as Balthasar does, that there is a real analogy between the created realm
and the divine may seem to posit too easy a correspondence, one that could fall into error
or even idolatry, as Karl Barth famously proclaimed.124 Balthasar, who welcomed a
dialogue with Barth, acknowledges this, and poses the following question: “Is it not
superficial to emphasize the analogies between God and the creature, not to mention
between the trinitarian God and intraworldly multiplicity, to the point (seemingly) of
ignoring the ‘greater dissimilitude’ that, nonetheless, remains fundamental for everything
else?”125 Balthasar’s answer is to employ a modified form of negative theology.
Negative theology, as conventionally conceived, is a philosophical or speculative
negation of names or attributes of God.126 However, as a philosophical system, it can
overshadow the positive role of revelation, which is among Balthasar’s central concerns.
Thus, just as he did with analogy he will do with negative theology. He will retain a sense
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of positive revelation and anchor the use of negative theology not within an
epistemological system but firmly within that revelation:
Negative theology takes on a radically different meaning as soon as we set foot in
the biblical realm. . . . What in the nonbibilical search for the primal ground
almost necessarily appeared as something free from the limitations of personality,
or something to be touched only in moments of ecstasy, suddenly steps forth with
the full impact of a spiritual freedom as the one God who has from the very start
already found man the seeker and now addresses him with his grace and his
demand. This puts an abrupt end to all system-building and to every form of
resignation.127
For Balthasar, negative theology as a system of negation betrays its own goals, precisely
because the role of negative theology should be to explode systems of thought, not secure
them.128 While at the outset negation seems to preclude the possibility of a confident
system, it is in actuality closed in upon its own assumptions. Balthasar’s version of
negative theology affirms creaturehood, privileges divine revelation, and avoids an alien
superstructure of negation, instead keeping the primary themes of scripture at the center
while still acknowledging a dissimilarity present in all language spoken about God.
It is this positive element of revelation that really drives negative theology’s role
for Balthasar. Negative theology is not so much about human epistemic limits (as Kilby
seems to say) as it is about the excess of love that is the Divine Being. Because of the
biblical revelation of God, “this awesome self-affirmation of God contains, as if
incidentally, an absolute negation.”129
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In Balthasar’s interpretation of the great apophatic theologian Pseudo-Dionysius,
he sees a “third step” in this process of affirmation and negation: the “hymnic.”
Balthasar’s discovery that “the ‘hymnic’ is therefore for Denys a methodology of
theological thinking and speaking”130 can also apply to Balthasar’s own thought.
Balthasar’s “robust” language is not a confident overextension of propositional language.
It is a deliberate heightening of tension that reaches a breakdown in the adequacy of
human language and instead stammers after the “the liturgical songs of heaven.”131
It is at this point that Karen Kilby completely misses the mark. While her
“programme of theological modesty” is an important corrective to some forms of
contemporary trinitarian theology, she classifies the language of Balthasar’s superkenosis as something like enlightenment deists’ claims, meaning not that deists would
posit a super-kenosis but that the linguistic style or intention of deistic claims about God
stems from a mechanical set of propositional statements. So, when Kilby says that we
have less of an understanding of God than the deists, she is speaking in terms of
propositional statements. She judges Balthasar as if he were making propositional, rather
than hymnic statements. If we use words as the deists do, of course what Balthasar is
doing seems overreaching and ill-advised. But if we recognize the modesty and negative
theology inherent in this hymnic and confident language of super-kenosis it will free us
to ruminate on Balthasar’s robust language without expecting a concise and digestible
definition of God under those terms.
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But, one might ask, do not most other theologians follow this form of negative
theology to some degree and yet end up with much more modest depictions of the inner
life of God? Undoubtably, Balthasar’s strain of negative theology does fit within the
general themes of Catholic thought, but he is more willing than they are to see a link
between negative theology, the economy of the revealed earthly Jesus, and the inner life
of the of the Trinity. Balthasar believes himself bound to consider this avenue of
approach and believes that it alone provides a true home for negative theology.
Rather than employing it as a way to stop human speech, Balthasar sees the
incommensurability of God as an impetus to create more speech, to stretch the meaning
of words. Balthasar purposefully uses provocative language in order to recognize that this
excess of meaning is not an absence or a negative feature of Christian thought but one of
the positive features of the Christian God. In this manner, he mimics the characteristics of
love that he sees within the Godhead.
Negative theology relates to the theme of kenosis in this way: the hymnic
element, instead of abiding in silence, ends up in an almost lyrical description of the
depths of God’s self-sacrificing and reckless love. Just as human love has inspired a
proliferation of sonnets, poems, letters, and songs, Balthasar is inspired to suffuse his
discourse with kenotic themes, since self-giving is the highest form of love. Balthasar’s
deep love for the creative mind flows from this theological stance. His unique collection
of lay styles of aesthetics, and his affection for Goethe and other forms of literature
confirm Balthasar’s commitment to a theology based in the language of love. In fact it is
the form of God, the beauty of God, that comes to us in the form of Jesus Christ that so
inspires his effusiveness. Rather than overconfidence, as Kilby claims, Balthasar’s only
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crime is an excessive description of love. His confidence arises from being gripped by the
self-giving God of love.
Christological and Trinitarian Kenosis
Perhaps the most basic guiding principle for Balthasar when it comes to trinitarian
thought is that there is an explicit connection between christological kenosis and
trinitarian kenosis. While such an idea is not completely unheard-of in theological circles,
Balthasar’s emphasis on it makes his work especially important for any attempt to
reconsider the kenotic motif.132 For Balthasar all trinitarian language must cohere around
the Incarnation and, more specifically, the Cross and descent of Jesus. As Rowan
Williams argues, the central question of Balthasar’s trinitarian theology is this: “What
does it mean to identify, as the definitive embodiment of God in human history, someone
who declares himself abandoned by God?”133 Balthasar’s answer to this question relies,
unequivocally, on the motif of kenosis: “There is only one way to approach the trinitarian
life in God: on the basis of what is manifest in God’s kenosis in the theology of the
covenant—and hence in the theology of the Cross—we must feel our way back into the
mystery of the absolute” (italics mine).134 There are two important elements to this
quotation. First, Balthasar explicitly identifies kenosis as the main theme in the covenant,
the Cross, and the inner trinitarian life. Second, he again emphasizes that any theology

132

Here I am thinking of Sergei Bulgakov, Karl Barth, and Adrienne Von Speyr.
Rowan Williams, “Balthasar and the Trinity,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hans Urs von
Balthasar, ed. Edward T. Oakes and David Moss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 37.
Edward Oakes says the same: “Balthasar develops his theology of the Trinity out of his conviction of what
it meant for Jesus to become cursed for our sake and experience the condemnation of the Father in hell.”
Oakes, Pattern of Redemption, 282.
134
Balthasar, TD 3, 301.
133

58

that properly understands this will suggest a blindness, a groping, through the dark to
reach ultimate mystery.135
Yet, while we human beings feel our way back to the trinitarian realm by
recognizing the kenotic form in Christ, the kenosis in the Trinity retains a depth of
meaning beyond what is revealed in the Cross. The Incarnation reveals, in full truth, the
contours of God’s character. Yet, because God’s character is a surplus of love and the
Incarnation itself is a trinitarian act, there must be a depth of meaning that the Incarnation
hints at that is beyond our understanding. This depth of meaning is the application of
kenosis to the trinitarian life that “makes possible all other kenotic movements of God
into the world; they are simply its consequences.”136 So, while the Incarnation is the
height of revelation, mystically and eschatologically speaking, the Son’s kenosis and
suffering in the world is a pale imitation of the force of love, recklessness, and abandon
that is achieved within the Persons of the Trinity.137
Kilby’s views here seem to be more muted. She agrees with this general
approach, i.e., from Christology to the biblical names of the Trinity, but she believes that
Balthasar is too confident and excessive in his approach, going beyond the themes of
revelation and perhaps recklessly entering the rarefied air of speculation.
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Adrienne Von Speyr and the Theology of Saints
Up to this point, I have discussed the problematic nature of Balthasar’s language
as viewed by some of his interpreters. I offered up the interplay of analogy, negative
theology, and the positivity of revelation as a way to understand Balthasar’s trinitarian
language. And, while Balthasar uses the language of groping and fumbling to describe
trinitarian reflection, he also clearly studies and describes intimate details of the inner
trinitarian life. Most theologians would not dare to broach this topic. What might account
for this difference, for this staunch commitment to putting words to the mystery of God,
this effusive discourse on the inner workings of trinitarian life even as he resists
“systems”? There is a rationale for some of his most robust language.
As Chapter Four will explain in further detail, the saints, to varying degrees,
become in Balthasar’s mind a fertile field of theological reflection within the bounds of
biblical narrative and church teaching. The theologian must attend to the saint:
For theologians, on the other hand, they [the saints] are rather a new
interpretation of revelation; they bring out the scarcely suspected treasures in the
deposit of faith. . . . Their sheer existence proves to be a theological manifestation
that contains most fruitful and opportune doctrine, the directions of the Holy
Spirit addressed to the whole Church and not to be neglected by any of her
members138 (italics mine).
This aspect of Balthasar’s thought is still underappreciated.139 The reason that he views
the saints this way is his view of God’s love and communication as fundamentally
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sacramental and excessive. God’s fullness knows no bounds and cannot be contained
within the scriptures or the sacraments alone, but bursts forth in the lives of those who
surrender themselves fully to him.
Balthasar’s most controversial and vivid depictions of the Trinity come from
Theo-Drama V, which is suffused with references to the mystic Adrienne von Speyr. Von
Speyr’s contemplative reading of scripture and her trinitarian awareness make their way
into Balthasar’s mindset, and he sees it, perhaps too uncritically, as another source of
revelation.140 Von Speyr’s thought holds special importance for Balthasar, not just
because of their close relationship and his respect for her writings, but because Balthasar
believed she ought to become a saint. So far this sentiment has not been shared in any
official capacity by the Church.
This does not erase the problematic nature of Balthasar’s speculations, nor is it an
attempt to lay blame on von Speyr for Balthasar’s idiosyncrasies, but I hope I have
pointed out an often-overlooked rationale for why Balthasar would order his trinitarian
formulations in relationship to her work. He sees in von Speyr’s writings a wealth of
meaning that has come from God to her.141 Balthasar felt it was his task to introduce her
importance to a wider circle. Her trinitarian reflections provide a way of deepening our

experiences have never been thoroughly “sifted by the Church” Kilby, Balthasar: A (Very) Critical
Introduction, 30.
140
In the “note” in Theo-Drama V, he refers to this work as expressing “our” theology after
mentioning the reoccurring footnotes to Von Speyr. For Balthasar, at least, his affinity with Von Speyr is
not a minor connection, especially here in volume five.
141
However, it is interesting to note that Balthasar (following off the quotation above) makes the
statement that we are not bound by the saints in any way. So perhaps it is possible or prudent for the
scholar following after von Balthasar to recognize that the Church has not officially made steps to declare
Adrienne a saint and even if it had, Balthasar would acknowledge our right to choose to build our theology
on a different source.

61

sense of what biblical revelation means. In the case of the Trinity, that involves paying
attention to God’s work in the mystics.
The saints provide, as Balthasar put it, “a new interpretation of revelation.” This is
precisely one of Kilby’s complaints: that robust trinitarianism is innovative in a way that
is detached from tradition. But Balthasar sees neglected aspects of tradition at work in the
saints that his theology might incorporate within it. So what seems to Kilby novel and
disjointed from historic Catholicism Balthasar sees as an underexplored aspect of it.
Super-Kenosis and Trinitarian Persons
While attempting to keep in mind the discussions about the mode or form of
theological discourse laid out in the previous section, this chapter will shift in focus to
some of the content of Balthasar’s trinitarian discourse. The theme central to this
argument is the idea of super-kenosis. Balthasar’s strict emphasis on the events of the
Incarnation leads him to link that kenosis with a prior and greater super-kenosis within
the triune relations. This use of the prefix “super” signifies the operation of negative and
analogical language. It contains within it the idea of negation and excess by indicating
that this kenosis is the exact image of what we see in the Incarnation, but also “positively
affirms” something “superior to all subsequent negations.”142 The affirmation and
negation continue on together in this language of “super-kenosis” because of the evergreater aspect of the divine life.
So what is “super-kenosis” as Balthasar employs it? Balthasar believes that
trinitarian love is always the mysterious and fruitful positivity of kenosis and that kenotic
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love is what characterizes the processions of the Trinity.143 The pattern of kenotic love
amongst the Trinity is one of full expropriation of self toward the other in love. Love has
many facets, and the “kenotic” and “self-giving” are the terms Balthasar believes are best
suited to indicating the wonderfulness and excess of love that he is so fond of expressing
in his theological extrapolations. The following section will scrutinize how the kenosis
motif appears in each person of the Trinity. This will allow for a new depth of
understanding of the function and application of kenosis in Balthasar’s thought.
What is the hallmark of the kenosis of the Father? To him belongs a primal
initiation, a first primordial kenosis in which the Father, “who was never a self-enclosed,
all-knowing person” dispossesses himself in favor of the Son . . . and through the Son, to
the Spirit.”144 The generation of the Son by the Father is seen not as an intellectual act but
as an act of self-bestowal: “But the Father possesses it [divinity] insofar as he begets
before thinking about it [unvordenklich]; he possesses it only as given away.”145 He gives
the gift of divinity fully to the Son: “In the Father’s love there is an absolute renunciation
of any possibility of being God for himself alone.”146 This kenotic activity grounds and
surpasses the economic kenotic activity of Jesus.
Even though the initiative for the kenotic event seems to lie with the Father,
possibly indicating that he is in control, Balthasar emphasizes that the Father initiates a
situation in which he allows himself to be conditioned by the other in the Son and
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entwines his reputation with the Son’s representation of him147 and characterizes this as a
“risk” taken by the Father.148 This risk is not a hesitant, calculating sort but a reckless
squandering of inexhaustible, infinite love for the Son:
There are no in-built securities or guarantees in the absolute self-giving of the
Father to Son, of Son to Father, and of both to the Spirit. Humanly speaking, it is
a total surrender of all possessions, including Godhead. From the giver’s point of
view, therefore, it could appear to be an absolute “risk”149 (italics mine).
Yet the level and type of risk this kenosis poses is unclear. Scholars are divided on this
issue. Linn Marie Tonstad argues that “the giver, the Father, revels in a seeming threat—
handing himself over entirely to another—yet never risks losing himself in this handingover, because he is always ontologically secured and guaranteed precisely in the event of
handing himself over.”150 For Tonstad, the “risk” is really more of a charade because, in
her view, real risk entails ontological instability. Because there is no ontological
instability associated with the Father’s generation of the Son, any language of suffering,
risk, or loss is an act. God, because he is self-giving, is incapable of risk. Bernhard
Blankenhorn acknowledges the same ontological stability for the Father that Tonstad
detects in Balthasar’s work but comes to a different conclusion. He simply states that
“nevertheless, an eminent wager” still exists, “one that is beyond our comprehension.”151
Perhaps Balthasar’s criticisms of Karl Rahner can illuminate, at least partially, the
importance of this discussion. Rahner comments, “I would say that there is a modern
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tendency . . . to develop a theology of the death of God that, in the last analysis, seems to
me to be gnostic. One can find this in Hans urs von Balthasar and in Adrienne von Speyr,
although naturally much more marked in her than in him.”152 Balthasar responds to this
line of criticism in the beginning of Theo-Drama V, saying,
Karl Rahner has dubbed our theology “gnostic”; in all probability he will
probably find his verdict even more strongly confirmed when he reads the chapter
on “the pain of God”. We find his verdict unacceptable . . . . As this final volume
of Theo-Drama comes to an end, it broadens out into what Karl Rahner rightly
and emphatically refers to as the “mystery of God”. Anything we say, by way of a
conclusion . . . is nothing more than an astonished stammering as we circle around
this mystery. We have tried to go as far as revelation permits—some may feel we
have gone one step too far.153
Balthasar sees Hegel’s work on the pain of God as valid and important, yet, in the same
introductory material of volume five, he distinguishes himself again from Hegel by
making use of a quotation from Kierkegaard:
The Hegelian babble about the real being the true is therefore the same kind of
confusion as when people assume that the words and actions of a poet’s dramatic
characters are the poet’s own. We must, however, hold fast to the belief that when
God—so to speak—decides to write a play, he does not do it simply in order to
pass the time, as the pagans thought. No, no: indeed, the utterly serious point here
is that loving and being loved is God’s passion. It is almost—infinite love!—as if
he is bound to this passion, almost as if it were a weakness on his part; whereas in
fact it is his strength, his almighty love: and in that respect his love is subject to
no alteration of any kind. There is a staggering perversity in all the human
categories that are applied to the God-man; for if we could speak in a completely
human way about Christ we would have to say that the words “My God, my God,
why have you forsaken me?” show a want of patience and a want of truth. Only if
god says it, can it be true, i.e., even if the god-man says it. And since it is true, it
is also truly the climax of pain. The relationship to God is evidently such a
tremendous weight of blessedness that, once I have laid hold of it, it is absolute in
the most absolute sense; by contrast, the worldly notion that my enemies are to be
excluded from it would actually diminish this blessedness.154
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This quotation indicates that, while Balthasar is appreciative of Hegel, he is not following
him completely. In fact, as Cyril O’Regan remarks, “Balthasar grants to Hegel,
Moltmann, and even ‘death of God’ theologians, that too often—although far from
univocally—the Christian tradition has peremptorily dispatched suffering or compassion
from its figuration of the divine.”155 Balthasar takes into account the pain of God
theologians and their concern, but points out, as the Kierkegaard quotation suggests, that
to make God’s suffering mean that it somehow weakens him does not coincide with the
biblical picture of God. He is concerned that it would make God’s own being depend on
the world for his enrichment. Here again we see that Balthasar’s reliance on analogy and
negative theology complicates but enriches the situation: “we approach the mystery from
two sides, that is, from that of negative theology, which excludes as ‘mythology’ any
notion that God has to be involved in the world process [Moltmann, Hegel]; and from the
point of view of the world drama, the possibilities of which must be grounded in God.”156
These possibilities include suffering and death but they do not mean what suffering and
death mean.
But while Balthasar at least sets a clear boundary around the terms of the
God-world relation, he is equally emphatic about the immanent Trinity:
The immanent Trinity must be understood to be that eternal, absolute selfsurrender whereby God is seen to be, in himself, absolute love; this in turn
explains his free self-giving to the world as love, without suggesting that God
“needed” the world process and the Cross in order to become himself (to ”mediate
himself”).157
In other words, the elements of the economic Trinity are grounded in the immanent.
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Balthasar expressly rules out Rahner’s complaint that his theology is gnostic in the same
sense as Hegel’s. But the problem left unresolved is how risk and kenosis can operate in
the Trinity. One can surmise that the attribution of risk to the inner trinitarian life is, at
the same time, more “risky” than anything exhibited in the God-world relationship. In
submitting fully to the existence of the Son, the Father brings into existence an Other that
is his equal. Kenotic love, in this primal instance, is the “letting be” of another. For
Balthasar, then, it seems that true love implies a full recognition of the other, not in a way
that endangers the ontological person of the Father but in a manner that allows room for
the activity and interaction of another.
In chapter two we discussed the Son’s kenosis as typified by two attitudes:
obedience to the Father and defenselessness. These two characteristics continue into the
immanent Trinity in “the perfect obedience of the Son, who wants to do nothing else on
earth but the will of the Father who sent him” (Jn 6:38). This is both the means and the
content of his eternal relationship with the Father. Obedience is the central activity and
the expression of that activity is to reveal the Father’s love. In the Son, the kenotic motif
is expressed as obediential love. The nature of obedience in this context could be
expressed in terms of receptivity or availability. When the Father gives himself fully to
the Son, his gift is vulnerably awaiting completion by the reception of the gift by the
Son.158 This reception is the meaning of obedience. The Son assents to the goals of the
Father.
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The attitude of defenselessness is also present in the Son’s relation to the Father.
Part of this relation is an implied distance or difference that allows for freedom. But it is
also true that the Son uses this freedom in a manner that is wholly transparent to the
Father and completely available to his wishes. It is this attitude or manner of relation that
holds within it the kernel of the Cross and Descent, which is brought out because of sin.
Obedience, just like risk, does still leave us with some complications. Obedience
implies a hierarchy—an uneven balance of power within the Godhead. For obedience to
be the central characteristic of the Son within the trinitarian realm seems suspect and
misguided. But when the Father’s attitude is also taken into account, the term
“obedience” loses its one-sidedness and balance is revealed. As with all of Balthasar’s
trinitarian constructions, it is important to keep in mind the dramatic character of this
encounter—each member of the Trinity has moments of receptivity and activity.
Balthasar argues that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son and is their
mutual love enlivened. He argues that “the Spirit, must also be God if he is to be the
‘personal’ seal of that self-expropriation that is identical in Father and Son. For the Spirit
does not want anything ‘for himself’ but, as his revelation in the world shows, wants
simply to be the pure manifestation and communication of the love between Father and
Son (Jn 1:26).”159 The Spirit, as the bond of love between the Father and Son, remains
withdrawn from the spotlight: “she gives place to Father and Son in a kind of kenosis
(which is why she is so hard to grasp as a Person).”160 The Spirit represents an
underdeveloped area in Balthasar’s thought that has a potentially important angle. In all
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the other relations Balthasar describes—mother-child, Father-Son, male-female—there is
a duality. But with the Spirit, the Spirit is always mediating between two others.
In discussing the Persons of the Trinity separately, but entirely within their
kenotic processions, it is also important to recognize the quality of their relationships that
ensures they retain their “ontological security,” to use Tonstad’s term. While God is
infinite, and superabundant, and his self-giving has no logical bounds, the self-gift of the
Father to the Son does not include his paternity. The paternity of the Father is not fully
given to the Son because this would result in the breakdown of the divine distance
between them. Kenotic love always takes place within relations. When those relations
dissolve, the result is self-annihilation, not self-giving. If one of the agents no longer
retains his or her personal core, then we have run aground on the unyielding shores of
absorption of autonomy. The trinitarian kenosis is meaningless if one of the Persons loses
his or her identity in the emptying.
While this ontological security of Paternity, Spiritness, and Sonship characterizes
the trinitarian life, “this does not imply that the Father holds back something for
himself.”161 The Father, in his very paternity, is available just as the Son and the Spirit
are also completely available to one another. The Father, in his Fatherhood, is completely
available and willing to do whatever the Son would ask. That is the manner in which the
Paternity of the Father is available to the Son. Likewise, Sonship and Spiritness each
retain a distinctive mysterious quality to them that is not eradicated in the kenotic
operations. Indeed it is that ontological stability that allows kenosis to be a meaningful
manner of activity.
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Trinity as an Event of Love
As Rowan Williams suggests, this plural nature is described in self-emptying
terms: “if the otherness of God is true otherness and if it is in no way conditioned from
beyond, then it can only be imagined as the action of love and freedom; and an act of
love and freedom that causes real otherness to subsist can in turn only be imagined as a
self-emptying, a kenosis.”162 The kenosis of the Trinity is not a static, ontological
emptying but an infinite event of kenotic love between the Persons. This shifts
conventional theological discussions of the Trinity considerably.
What is at stake, at least in a perspective of depth, is an altogether decisive turnabout in the way of seeing God. God is not, in the first place, “absolute power”,
but “absolute love”, and his sovereignty manifests itself not in holding on to what
is its own but in its abandonment—all this in such a way that his sovereignty
displays itself in transcending the opposition, known to us from the world,
between power and impotence.163
This eventful nature that Balthasar perceives in God allows for a real, if qualified, sense
of eternal becoming within Balthasar’s theology. God-as-event provides Balthasar with a
sense of dynamic continuous excess of relational love. The Father continually gives all of
himself to the Son, and the Son continually gives all of himself to the Father. The Spirit
continually bridges this love and, at the same time, is this love.164
Because of Balthasar’s commitment to finding the Trinity in biblical events and
envisioning the Trinity itself as an event, the death of Christ leads Balthasar to conclude
that there must be something within the triune life that could approximate and surpass
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separation and death. In an infamous and much-debated165 passage, Balthasar posits a
kind of super-death in the Trinity:
In giving of himself, the Father does not give something (or even everything) that
he has but all that he is—for in God there is only being, not having. This total
self-giving, to which the Son and the Spirit respond by an equal self-giving, is a
kind of “death”, a first, radical “kenosis”, as one might say. It is a kind of “superdeath” that is a component of all love and that forms the basis in creation for all
instances of “the good death”, from self-forgetfulness in favor of the beloved right
up to that highest love by which a man gives his life for his friends.166
The question that needs to be asked at this point is: does not this language of super-death
in the triune life make death coterminous with love?167 The short answer is yes, but love
is not prefixed with “super.” Balthasar is using the word “death” in a qualified way that
he never does with the word “love.” Furthermore, the Father’s death metaphorically
results in the life of the Son. What are the implications for placing an analogous form of
death so highly within the trinitarian life? For Balthasar, death expresses the extent and
depths of love. Death functions neither in terms of tragic finality nor as an idealized
sacrifice, but as a point of powerful excess that serves to describe love: “Greater love has
no one than this, that someone lay down his life for his friends” (Jn 15:13, ESV). Death,
within a dialogical structure of personhood, represents a respect for the value of the other,
a creating of “space.”
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In the case of the Trinity, death does not mean the annihilation of the Father, but it
creates a space for the unexpected and the spontaneous to occur. This primal death is in
some sense of recognition of the Other, a giving space to the Other. The difference
between Moltmann, for example, and Balthasar is that “Moltmann’s understanding of
primal kenosis as divine withdrawal … takes its cues from the Jewish notion of zimzum,
... [while] Balthasar’s idea of kenosis stem[s] from the Father’s generation of the Son.”168
The added feature, for Balthasar, is that this Super-Death is gifted to the Son in a manner
that does not withdraw from him but supports him in his own agency. Balthasar’s kenotic
death is thus also called ecstatic self-gift.
Ontological Difference
This primal trinitarian drama of kenotic love that Balthasar infers from the
Incarnation and Cross, then, has import for the idea of ontological difference. This intratrinitarian exchange holds within it the mysterious yet very meaningful answer to the
problems outlined in chapter one. More broadly, the Trinity is viewed as an answer to the
entanglements of other philosophical traditions. Difference protects kenosis from
becoming absorption because what is demanded of the Other is not the eradication of self
(anti-difference) but the gift of self in freedom.
As mentioned in Chapter One, Balthasar continues to see the absorption and
autonomy models of human activity as threats to human freedom. This same concern is
present in his discussions of the Trinity, yet he speaks about it slightly differently. He
says that “two approaches are barred us: the idea of a Father who generates the Son in
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order to come to know himself as God and the idea of a Father who, because he has
already known himself perfectly, generates the Son.”169
For Balthasar, the first approach is “Hegelianism.” The problem with Hegelianism
is that the distance between God and the world is not preserved, which destroys the
integrity that arises from separating humanity and the divine. While Balthasar’s primary
concern here is that Hegel’s approach means that God is now under an external necessity,
we can also see how the anthropological situation would be affected by this. Human
persons within the world would then be either competing or cooperating for meaning
with God. If God needs the world in some way, creaturely freedoms become unmoored
and the created order becomes a stepping stone in God’s game of self-actualization.
The second approach mentioned in the quotation creates an improper hierarchy
between the Father and the Son, which in terms of trinitarian doctrine means the Father
exists at some prior moment in which he was not part of Trinity. The implications of this
approach would be aligning Balthasar with Arianism. Going beyond the Trinity is a
refusal to accept revelation, a refusal to cease speculation, and a form of hubris. This
approach destroys the integrity of the Trinity.
This ontological difference is how Balthasar’s conception of God can be allpowerful, yet vulnerable to the Other.
By taking the loss of God into himself, God, on the Cross, formed a space within
himself where those without God can dwell. Thus denial, diremption and
alienation from the Christian narrative became a moment in that narrative itself.
We may deny God, but he does not deny us. A Christian metaphysics therefore
needs to reflect at the level of ontology precisely this inclusivity of the Christian
narrative and, critically, its ability not just to think difference but also to think
difference from itself. It has metaphysically to embrace its own negation, just as
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the Christian narrative is able narratively to encompass the empty space beyond
its own limits. This points in the direction of a metaphysics of kenosis rather than
one of creation. This will be no less Trinitarian, of course, but will reflect rather
the Trinity in action, transcending itself and engaging itself fully and at risk in the
world. It will thus not be a contemplative understanding of Being as object of
knowledge, even the knowledge which comes of faith, but will be historical or
enacted Being.170
Oliver Davies’s remarks in the quotation above point out that the trinitarian reflection
Balthasar is enacting is not “an object of reflection” but a continuing historical event that
mysteriously preserves the integrity of creation.
This ontological mode of Balthasar’s, in which he uses trinitarian doctrine to
explain philosophical difference, does seem to validate Kilby’s concern, i.e., that
Balthasar uses the Trinity as an explanatory tool to solve the deficiencies he sees in other
religions and philosophies laid out in Chapter One. Paying close attention to the language
discussed above should allow one to see that there is Balthasar significantly qualifies his
description of super-kenosis. He seems to lack that subtlety when it comes to superkenosis’s ontological implications and his polemics against other philosophies and
worldviews.
Conclusion
Balthasar’s trinitarian theology considerably deepens the concept of kenosis in the
following ways. First, he connects kenosis within the Trinity to biblical revelation. He
attempts to find a way to elaborate on this connection, using analogy, negative theology,
and his understanding of the saints in order to erect a theology that can not only explain a
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real and passionate interaction between God and creatures but also reconfigure our
understanding of divinity away from static omnipotence to an event of self-giving love.
Second, in terms of anthropological implications, it is now hopefully clear how
the christological and trinitarian doctrines of kenosis open up a real space for human
beings to utilize their freedom and seek their own meaning. This trinitarian and
christological conception of kenosis is what gives Balthasar a way past the problems of
absorption and autonomy discussed in the first chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE SAINTS AND KENOSIS
The first chapter established what Balthasar identifies, for the purposes of guiding
interpretation, as the outer boundaries of the kenotic motif: the concepts of absorption
and autonomy. The next two chapters established Balthasar’s understanding of the
kenotic motif as it was expressed in the divine manifestation in the Incarnation and Cross
(Chapter Two) and also within the trinitarian relations (Chapter Three). These chapters
established Balthasar’s constructive contribution to the concept of kenosis. The last two
chapters will investigate Balthasar’s understanding of kenosis and human agency. While
human agency and kenosis differ from divine agency and kenosis, it is important to
Balthasar that human realities always maintain an analogy to the divine. 171 This link, for
Balthasar, is, perhaps, most clearly shown in the saints.
Why the Saints?
It is perhaps unsurprising that, like many twentieth-century Protestant scholars,
Donald Dawe is unable to connect mystical texts and the saints with theology. In his
historical study of the the kenotic motif, these themes were muted. In fact, they barely
merited a footnote.172 Unlike Dawe, Balthasar not only connects the saints and spirituality
directly to doctrine, but he does so specifically through the idea of kenosis. For Balthasar
the saints represent the “living gospel,” something that theological discourse can only
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clumsily imitate,173 and a serious study of saints and sanctity is necessary to keep the
lifeblood of the Gospel pumping through dogmatic expression. Saints, not theologians
“are the authentic interpreters of theo-drama.”174
But the relation between the saint and theological expression should not be taken
as permission for an anthropologically founded approach to doctrine. It is not as if the
whole of human experience exhibited in the saint is normative for theological expression.
Instead, what is most important about the saints coheres around the external application
of christological mission on their lives. This mission, not necessarily the personality or
teaching of the saint, is what is most important. Yet this mission is not a monolithic or
homogenous collection of themes that somehow blots out the uniqueness of each saint.
Each mission, while christologically formed (i.e., bearing the stamp of obedience and
self-giving), interacts with each person differently and makes different demands upon
them.
This approach to spirituality means Balthasar sees an unlimited number of
expressions of kenotic activity while still retaining a central focus on following and being
transparent to Christ.175 It is similar to the actor finding his or her place within the
narrative of a play. They each have a way of asserting their personalities and skills upon
the project, yet they are working within a narrative that they did not create.
This multiplicity of missions and manifestations reinforces Balthasar’s suspicions
of “systematic” or manualist approaches to theology. He equates the kenotic reality with
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the “sign of Jonah,” indicating that the Gospel is a scandalous proposition that is not
merely assented to intellectually but requires from the human person its own kenotic
response: “Jesus refuses to give a sign in proof of his authority, such as would enable
men to recognise him without risk, without committing themselves to him.”176 There
cannot be one impersonal system of self-sacrifice that requires a set list of renunciations
or that can be performed without uncertainty.
Instead the kenosis of Christ is concretely pluriform, and this is how the saints
provide a “deepening of revelation.”177 If theological apologetics can never expect (nor
should they try) to succeed in removing faith and scandal from the Gospel, then, as
Balthasar sees it, the saints are the best option for constructing an apologetic for the
Christian worldview.178 This focus on the saints allows for a multiplicity of descriptions
of the Christian life and it offers a more direct and concrete description of Christianity.179
“The Faith of the Simple Ones”: Main Themes for Interpretation
In Balthasar’s essay “The Faith of the Simple Ones,” there is a programmatic
passage that provides the essential thematic elements for understanding kenosis and the
saints. In what follows, I will exegete this text in order to find the unifying elements in
Balthasar’s approach to the saints. These features can be seen at work in his discussion of
the saints discussed in detail later in the chapter.
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The same is true of the “images” of the Church’s saints, who come from
the superfigure of the Cross and are readable only on the basis of the
Cross. They, too, always stand, in one way or another, in the focal point of
the covenant, at the point where the paths between God and man meet and
intersect, and they can do this only in that unconditional obedience that
has received various names in the course of the Church’s history but has
always remained the same: apatheia, self-abandonment, indifferencia.
This is always the point of fundamental acceptance of the embodiment of
whatever God wills and is therefore a place of death (naturally this is the
death of Jesus: 2 Cor 4:10), whether this death now expresses itself as the
“dark night” (John of the Cross), as “dying in that one cannot die” (Teresa
of Jesus), as the readiness to let oneself be shared out in every way
(Thérèse of Lisieux), as the “whylessness” of love (Eckhart), or in some
other way. Certainly, an elementary love of neighbor will always grow out
of this attitude; but the decisive thing is that it does not keep its own
measurement in its hand but that the fruitfulness for the world and for
humanity of the life that is surrendered to God is ultimately something that
God alone determines.180
This paragraph encompasses all the major elements needed to understand and develop
Balthasar’s understanding of the saints and their place in theology and the church.
First is the phrase “the images of the Church’s saints.” This indicates, succinctly,
that the saints and the church stand in relation to one another. In fact, individual saints
cannot be understood apart from the idea of the communio sanctorum. Both canonical
saints and everyone else who participates in Christ are part of the communio sanctorum
and through it become de-privatized and their personhood is defined in theological terms:
Everyone who participates in the pneumatic body of Christ, shared out in
the Church, not only becomes a member of the church community: he
actually acquires an intrinsically ecclesial quality. Every theological
person thus has whole spheres of community that are personal to him, and
the interpenetration of these spheres constitutes the reality of the
communio sanctorum with its mysterious laws whereby each can “be for”
others through prayer, initiative and suffering on their behalf.181
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The radical idea that the Church and all its members are not just individual private agents,
determining their own lives, but are responding to the invitation to be a part of God’s
salvific process—a role of “dependent participation” in various strengths—opens up a
space “where others can receive freedom to act.”182 This participation creates agency in
others. This is the idea of being de-privatized. Balthasar says that, “in a narrower and
more intensive sense, it means that every man, insofar as he possesses complete human
nature, has access through love and understanding to all that is thought and felt, done and
suffered by other subjects possessing the same nature.”183 There is a real sharing of
burdens and responsibilities taking place through these “mysterious laws.”184
The second aspect of this quotation is the description of “the ‘images’ of the
Church’s saints as those “who come from the superfigure of the Cross and are readable
only on the basis of the Cross”185 (italics mine). This sentence indicates, again, that any
theological import that we procure from a saintly life extends only as far as that
individual is transparent to Christ: “The authentic saint is the one who always ‘confuses
himself the least with Christ and who, therefore, can most convincingly be transparent to
Christ.’”186 In other words, the saint is not a separate source of doctrine but a
continuation of christological doctrine. The elevation of the saints to theological
importance in Balthasar’s work grows out of Christ’s inclusivity in the Incarnation.
Christ’s kenotic availability is what allows the saints to act in a similar manner, not by
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mere imitation but by mystically sharing the acting space made available to them through
Christ.
In addition to the mystical/sacramental connection between Christ and the saint,
the “superfigure of the Cross” also represents a clear theological starting point instead of
an anthropological one. Balthasar wants to ensure that an examination of saints does not
become tied to universal human desires or a reduction to psychological or philosophical
foundations. He is not advocating a turn to the subject in his suggestion that theologians
should study the saints. Rather, what remains most significant in the saints is that they are
concrete representatives of a theological expression of divine activity, i.e., kenotic love.
The next significant phrase in this quotation is the phenomenon of “unconditional
obedience,” “apatheia,” or “self-abandonment.” This nexus of words surrounds and gives
coloration to the kenotic motif. These ideas permeate the whole history of spirituality
and, as Balthasar here indicates, they are the sole point of evaluation of a saintly life.
Every saint, no matter the time, culture, or context, must bear the kenotic stamp upon
their lives to be considered authentic. Each saint elaborates on this motif slightly
differently, allowing for multiple angles of observation, contemplation, and action.187 It is
this variance that allows a fruitful elaboration of the parameters and meanings of kenosis
for human agency.
The meaning of a particular saint’s life remains at some level mysterious. The
saints are not fully accessible to us; the full meaning of their mission is hidden with God.
As such, human measurements and methods, understandings of justice, agency, and
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happiness will be stretched past their breaking points. God’s measurement and direction,
not only of each saint but also of each theological person, will be the sole director and
measurer of any activity, including martyrdom, death, and other difficult situations.
This again, poses a problem for dialogue with those of differing viewpoints from
Balthasar. Balthasar claims that an inability to accept this pattern of kenosis as part of the
Gospel is due to a lack of commitment to the person of Christ. Commitment and risk are
required for understanding the full meaning of the Christian life, and it cannot be
examined from an external objective vantage point. Balthasar declares that “Christian
existence is always doomed to draw the shorter straw, because there is no earthly scale of
measurement which can be applied to its contents. Such a scale of measurement cannot
and must not exist, if faith is to remain itself.”188 Faith and kenosis presuppose a certain
existential stance toward truth—that it cannot be examined from an external, objective
vantage point.
External safeguards, an internal logic, and ecclesial discernment guide us as we
discern not only the meaning of saintly missions but also our own individual missions.
The proposal that risk and commitment are central to understanding Christian
discipleship in addition to God-granted individual missions seems to allow individualistic
interpretations kenosis’s meaning. But Balthasar recognizes that there is an internal order
and logic to his position that, to some degree, can be demonstrated through the saints to
those who are willing to see it.
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The saints are to be assessed by the apostolic authority of the Church. The
individual saint is declared to be a model worthy of emulation through a careful process.
The Church protects the faithful laity from error by publicly recognizing the saints who
have aligned themselves with the Gospel. Yet, even with the addition of ecclesial support,
faith requires us to suspend our own ideas of what success and failure, freedom and
bondage, death and life, suffering and bliss might mean, in favor of meanings that we
grasp as we contemplate God’s mission for our lives.
The main premise of this chapter, in terms of kenosis, is that the central pattern of
self-giving identified in Christ becomes multiplied and contextualized in the missions of
the saints. So, it follows that each saint, to a greater or lesser degree, could reveal how
human agency and kenosis might operate in the human realm. It makes sense, then, to
examine what Balthasar says about certain saints, in hopes that it will reveal the many
possible movements of kenotic activity.189
The rest of this chapter will deal with Balthasar’s treatment of individual saints:
John of the Cross, Thérèse of Lisieux, and Elizabeth of the Trinity. These three provide
additional color to the motif of kenosis, because each saint enacts it differently. This
discussion will, I hope, allow for a more nuanced picture of kenotic activity.
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John of the Cross and the “Scream of the Vivisected Soul”
John’s spiritual way is well known for its emphasis on radical darkness, NeoPlatonic influences, and renunciation of earthly pleasures. If the language of selfannihilation is to be found anywhere in the Christian tradition, John of the Cross would
be a likely source. As such, John of the Cross could be one of the best challenges to
Balthasar’s conception of the positive connection between human agency and kenotic
practice.
Despite Balthasar’s recognition of the ubiquitous presence of “massive negation”
found in the Carmelite’s poetry,190 his understanding of the context in which to situate
this experiential “negative” language so that it can be interpreted in positive terms.
Calling John’s poetry “decisive” for a proper understanding of the saint, Balthasar
resolutely argues that all of John’s descriptions of dark nights are only in the service of
love, that his mystical theology is one of profoundly biblical proportions, and that the
trinitarian background to his contemplative worldview enhances the reality of the
individual soul. In a provocative and comprehensive passage, Balthasar states:
We are now a long way from Bonaventure and the whole Neo-Platonic
ascent by stages from type to archetype. We are closer to Francis, but
closer still to the remorseless sword of the Gospel word, which for the
love of the One demands the hatred of everything else. And the sword
must pierce to the division of the joints and marrow of the soul, the
division of the soul from itself, before the promise of the hundredfold can
be fulfilled on earth. To bear witness to this, poetry must therefore begin
inside the division, as the scream of the vivisected soul in the middle of
the night, in order to end in the song of praise of the soul, even more fully
alive at a deeper level, wounded in the fire of glory. It is the fiery arrow of
the seraph (John explicitly quotes this) that pierces the souls of Francis
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and Theresa-beyond pain and pleasure, wound and health, life and
death.191
There are several aspects of this passage crucial to Balthasar’s interpretation. What he
sees operating in John is not an abstract radical philosophical mysticism but an invitation
that stems from the Gospel itself. Clearly, since Balthasar’s project is to uphold the worth
of self and maintain a relational understanding of the self in light of the liberating power
of the Gospel, the language here should raise concern. If Jesus proclaims healing to the
brokenhearted (Luke 4), how does a “scream of the vivisected soul” bring healing? If the
soul is annihilated, how can it become well? For John of the Cross (and for Balthasar) it
is through the resurrection that these experiences of night do not overwhelm.192 In
Balthasar’s interpretation, then, what John is calling for is not renunciation in and for
itself but instead a transparent attempt to arrive at the depths and pleasures of trinitarian
love. For Balthasar, in John the self comes into a new level of reality, more intensely
glorious than the first. For this vivisection is not a ruthless and pointless experience but
one that results in personal agency, understood as being “even more fully alive at a
deeper level.” This is an attempt to shed an illusory self in favor of a true self, not an
attempt by John of the Cross to annihilate his own personality.
Yet Balthasar is not entirely satisfied with John of the Cross. While John paints a
vivid picture of the relationship of the soul with God, Balthasar sees an unfortunate
191
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absence of the social, ecclesial, and human element to his worldview: “Where, in the
whole of John’s work, is the neighbour? Where is the communion of saints? Where is the
Johannine criterion for love of God: love of the brother? This is taken for granted and
receives no special emphasis, just as the Church in all her visibility is taken for
granted.”193 While leaving that area underexplored may have been acceptable in John’s
own context, Balthasar will not let that be in his own work.194 This also demonstrates
that an individual saint, no matter how great, can only exhibit a partial revelation of
Christ.
In sum, Balthasar views the dark night as part of a larger journey into trinitarian
love. This love then provides not only an affirmation of the self in terms of a relation with
God but also avoids describing the Gospel only in terms of suffering. Yet, as Balthasar
noted, John does not provide us a sufficient understanding of a relationality among
neighbors, the church, and our enemies. This will need to come from another source.
John’s life and mission do reveal a positive aspect of kenosis: For John,
renunciations are a way of prioritizing in his spiritual life. His priority is to reach the
trinitarian love of God. For him this involves rejecting many legitimate good things in
recognition that there is something better.
A kenotic attitude such as this will bear with it a sense of loss, since there are
legitimate goods that are sacrificed (physical comfort, rest, family), but it is absolutely
crucial to see that, for John, pain is not central to achieving his goal but a by-product of
it. This isn’t to make light of his spiritual and physical suffering—sometimes it is very
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real and overwhelming, making it difficult to see anything else. It is merely to point out
the difference between the spirituality of John and the spirituality of absorption described
in the first chapter. In the absorption model, the physical world and the human body is
illusory or evil, and all who enjoy its fruits are deluded. In the absorption model, pain is
interpreted as the reality of the soul extricating itself from its unworthy material prison.
For John, the pain involved in his spiritual journey is felt because the rejection of earthly
things is rejection of something truly good in favor of something deeper and greater. In
addition, his end goal is not an ontological absorption (which would mean death) but a
union in difference.
The area where John fails us, or at least is silent, is the connection to community
and to the neighbor. John’s spirituality lacks an explicit and deep connection to ecclesial
and human relationships and, without an explicit connection to the communio sanctorum,
the meaning of the contemplative journey for the entire Church and world is lost. John’s
sense of agency and his mission represent a relentless struggle to prioritize full surrender
to God in all things, yet his approach lacks the communal quality that Christian selfsurrender has within it.
Thérèse of Lisieux and the Little Way
According to Balthasar, Thérèse “understood the act of total surrender to the
triune God as the highest possible form of engagement on behalf of the world’s
salvation.”195 Right away, we can see that, in Thérèse, there is this explicit ecclesial
connection between her surrender and the wider community. This highest act, again, is
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the phenomenon I am describing as kenosis. So how does this phenomenon interact with
Thérèse’s sense of agency and purpose? In order to understand this we will have to
examine her “Little Way,” her particular path to full agency and existence.
What is interesting to note here is that her own fulfillment and happiness, while
implicit in her spirituality, is by no means the central piece. In fact, in many places her
own happiness seems barely sustainable. But, in the absence of its overt presence,
happiness is allowed to find its true home. According to Balthasar, the conventional
models of ascent from the more overtly platonic spiritual sources tend to have eros as
their driving force. This is the individual’s relentless will toward unity, toward love,
toward contemplation of the divine. But for Thérèse, even this eros is stripped away from
her:196 “The ‘little way’ that Thérèse now constructs comes from renouncing everything
in Christian love that seems to lend it greatness, power and glory. Love is brought to a
state of weakness in which it learns the power of divine love, of littleness and darkness in
which the greatness and glory of divine love are displayed. The basis of the little way,
therefore is one series of renunciations after another.”197 While an eros-driven spirituality
may not be undertaken to seek greater power or glory, it is definitely undertaken with an
ascending mindset. Thérèse’s little way is not ascending but instead allowing herself to
be active in continual renunciations with no attempt to move beyond them. The little way
expresses the kenotic motif in terms of the simple, hidden moments in life when one can
minister to another. Unlike John’s poetic vision of the individual and God, Thérèse’s
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kenotic expression is oriented toward serving others in addition to God with small,
concrete acts of kindness.
In fact the aspect that Balthasar most praises is her ability to renounce even selfmeasurement: “more important even than the renunciation of her strength is her
renunciation of progress.”198 This particular moment adds something new to descriptions
of the kenotic motif. Obviously Thérèse’s actions themselves, small and large, were
intended to decrease her “self.” Yet, at an even deeper level, it was less about a conscious
movement to decrease herself and more a focus on ministering to others, even the divine.
In one of her most striking passages she observes that “it is up to us to console Jesus, not
up to him to console us.”199 This incredible statement indicates a total focus on God,
placing all spirituality in relation to God and not on our own holiness or our own mystical
states.
Yet Balthasar points out some shortcomings of her spirituality that, curiously,
might lean toward the autonomy approach: her radical disposition toward suffering;
Balthasar cautions that at some points Thérèse seems to go over the edge into masochism.
One may seriously wonder whether Thérèse does not go too far with this
line of thought [glorification of suffering] and actually fall into the
excesses of ‘existentialism’. If so, it arises out of her need to bring all her
life into the clear light of consciousness so as to reflect upon it . . . . She is
meant to suffer; doubtless she is right. But she seizes upon it so eagerly
that there is little room left for God to propose any other destiny. It is, as it
were, on her own initiative that she compresses suffering and happiness
into a synthesis.200
One of the reasons this might fit the autonomy model is that Thérèse seizes on her own
initiative in order to suffer and seems to equate suffering with happiness. It is not like the
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absorption model, in which suffering leads to a purification of the creaturely in favor of
an ontological fusion with the divine. Instead she confidently pursues a spiritual ideal of
her own choosing as the way to maximize her spiritual life. 201
One of the distinctive features of Balthasar’s brand of kenotic activity is the
distinction he makes between it and suffering. This is clearly an advantage that Balthasar
works from this view. It allows his spirituality to relate to suffering in a way that does not
glorify it but does not dismiss it. For Balthasar suffering is perhaps inevitable, according
to the biblical record, but it should not be sought out in the name of self-abandonment.
Balthasar cautions us precisely at this point of suffering in Thérèse’s life that is crucial.
Kenotic spirituality is letting go of our own assumptions about what spirituality is and
what God is calling us to. The mistake Thérèse made, he reminds us, was to assume that
suffering must be God’s calling for her. It may not have been her destiny.
Balthasar’s spirituality is flexible, truly capable of dealing deftly with various
situations because its only constant is the will to obey and the ability to suspect one’s
own judgments in order to follow God’s mission. So what does this description of
Thérèse teach us about Balthasar’s vision of kenosis? First, he praises her ability to move
beyond self-assessment in her spiritual progress. This fits with his allergy to all system
building, disdaining it as a way for humanity to attempt to exert control over their
relationship to God. The spirituality of kenosis is the alternative to this attitude, and
Balthasar sees it at work in her life in a divine way. Furthermore, Thérèse’s tendency to
always accept or seek suffering breaches the earlier ideal of letting go of self-assessment.
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In her decision to fully embrace suffering, not only did she improperly fuse her happiness
with it but she too quickly grasped it as God’s will when there may have been another
path for her.
Elizabeth “the Vanishing”202
Elizabeth of the Trinity represents another great saint in Balthasar’s account, and,
although her style can at times lean toward what he calls the kitsch,203 he sees in her a
deep earnestness and radical one-sidedness204 that provide something of merit for the
theologian. Like John of the Cross, Elizabeth expresses a remorseless and unapologetic
desire to strip everything down to the barest of forms in order to grasp the one central
thing, the love of God for his children. Even Elizabeth’s own happiness is relegated to the
background in this quest.
In terms of kenotic activity, this stripping down is presented eloquently in the
theme of self-forgetfulness. She says that “the secret of peace and happiness lies in selfforgetting, in no longer being preoccupied with oneself.”205 This self-forgetting,
Balthasar claims, simultaneously becomes for the soul the forgiveness of her sins and a
recognition of the overwhelming power and endless scope of grace.”206
It is acknowledged that all this language is very one-sided and imbalanced. Yet it
provides clear access to a truth that otherwise might be muted. Balthasar believes it is a
timely reminder to the church.207 But its one-sidedness means that the radical call to selfforgetfulness in the light of God’s love might harbor within it some aspects that need to
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be qualified. One of Balthasar’s concerns about Elizabeth is her ability to withdraw from
the world to such a degree, and he raises the possibility here, just as in Thérèse, that
Elizabeth “almost seems to view with a sort of pleasure the wasting and burning her
sickness causes her.”208 In both of these instances, Balthasar writes in positive terms
about kenosis and spiritualities that he admires, but remains sensitive to the issue of
glorifying suffering.
Though he identifies this glorification of suffering as an impulse toward the
autonomy model of understanding kenosis, it also calls to mind the spiritual ideal of
absorption. Is all this self-forgetting to be taken to mean that a person ceases to exist? In
this instance, Balthasar believes this is emphatically not the case that, as in John, only the
illusory self is left behind. “The ever-repeated wish to lose herself in God in the Endless
One, is thus, not a metaphysical desire [italics mine], but a simple movement of love . . . .
‘To lose oneself’ must be understood here in the sense of the Lord’s commandment—in
the loss of one’s own soul lies the key to entry into the kingdom of love, in which the ‘I’
indeed, but not a single ‘Thou’, is lost.”209 I think this means that, according to Balthasar,
Elizabeth never requires the true self (“thou”) to be turned over to God in a way that
annihilates it. The movement of finite love toward one who is infinite is simple. In the
process the false self (I) that Paul refers to as the “old man” does become obliterated.
This is why Elizabeth feels such freedom and joy in her self-forgetfulness. It is a leaving
behind of an illusory version of herself in exchange for one who is fully alive within the
presence of God.
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Elizabeth’s life exhibits a clearer connection between happiness, agency, and selfsurrender than those of the other saints discussed here. She seems more willing to allow
the language of happiness to be paired with that of self-forgetfulness. Yet her embrace of
suffering and her tendency to withdraw from the world, border on the problematic
absorption spirituality210 Here, the language of happiness, when combined with her view
of suffering, poses the risk of a dangerous conclusion, not just for human agency but also
for the nature of spirituality in general.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this chapter has brought to the fore several themes for the
understanding of kenosis, Balthasar, and human agency. First, the saints (and all nonsainted Christians) become persons through participation in the kenotic activity of Jesus
within the communio sanctorum. This kenotic activity is then passed onward through the
Holy Spirit’s activity and allows individuals to become true persons. Second, the lives of
the individual saints and Balthasar’s commentary on them reveal more clearly some of
the patterns of kenosis in human agency. According to his interpretation, the saints all
undertake renunciations in the name of the love of God. They approach this love in
various ways but they do not practice anything that we might call metaphysical selfannihilation, and he is willing to criticize these saints when they veer too close to a
glorification of suffering or a hostile view of earthly realities. This points to Balthasar’s
distinguishing between kenosis and the twin problematic poles of absorption and
autonomy. Rather than absorption or autonomy, he identifies these saints’ goal as the
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stripping away of the illusory self, which is painful, allowing one to find true agency and
happiness.
One question that lurks behind all three saints’ attitude of unconditional
obedience is the possibility of death as an event that will be experienced by the saints.
While not perfectly articulated in Balthasar’s description of saints, this theme is
obviously connected with kenosis and agency. This is particularly difficult for the
contemporary situation because it appears that a kenotic spirituality is inherently driven
toward death, as in the case of suffering. Since the saintly life is christologically formed,
death is an inevitable part of Balthasar’s spirituality. Because he sees the communio
sanctorum as a continuation of Jesus’s salvific work, death will always be a part of
Christian experience. Resurrection is also there and it is hidden with the fruitfulness of
the saint. For Balthasar the true meaning of the saints and their impact on the world
cannot be penetrated fully.
Finally, Balthasar’s description of kenosis in the lives of the saints provides both a
social dimension to kenosis and an open-ended respect for divergent spiritual paths. In
fact his theology demands that each individual receive a specialized mission from God.
This means that for Balthasar human agency is achieved in numerous ways and depends
on divine guidance to understand how this is best achieved. The saints present a concrete
experience of the theme of difference.

CHAPTER FIVE
KENOSIS AND THE SPIRITUAL PATHWAY TO AGENCY
The preceding chapters demonstrated the vital importance of the motif of kenosis
in Balthasar’s theology. This chapter represents a continuation of that theme within the
realm of spirituality. In brief, spirituality will be defined here as Balthasar refers to it:
“revelation . . . realized in practice.”211 God’s revelation is what creates and defines
spirituality. Within the context of this final chapter, then, the relation between human
agency and the activity of self-surrender present in the kenotic motif will be investigated
in depth. First I will address the relationship of theology to spirituality in Balthasar’s
preferred mode, focusing on the gospel as the unifying factor and norm over all
spirituality. Following this, I will explore themes germane to Balthasar’s
conceptualization of spirituality—philosophical difference, the scandal over spiritual
systems, personalizing mission, and discernment—and how these themes may interact
with Christian perfection, self-love, human agency, and human relationships.
The Relationship between Theology and Spirituality
There are three ways of relating the academic study of spirituality and theology.
The first way is to separate them completely. This approach has been a viable option
since the scholastic era. The assumption of this approach is that spirituality and theology
have completely different goals, methods, and authorities. Spirituality centers on
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affective experiences, mystical writings, and spiritual practices. From this perspective,
mystics such as Teresa of Avila and John of the Cross end up as “lyrical poets” leaving
“dogma to the prosaic work of the School.”212 In contrast, theology centers on an orderly,
comprehensive, and rational defense of Christian beliefs. This perspective dominated
Catholic theological centers of study during Balthasar’s own time.213
Another perspective to spirituality and theology would be to privilege one
discipline over the other. The tension between spirituality and theology was heightened
with the advent of the Enlightenment. Some Christian thinkers, such as John Toland,
treated spirituality as irrational and superstitious. In his attempt to make Christianity
more palatable in the Enlightenment context, he located the essence of Christianity within
the explanatory power of reason.214 Admittedly, John Toland’s approach is a fairly
simplistic example. His contemporary Friedrich Schleiermacher, on the other hand, went
in the opposite direction, identifying the essence of Christianity with the feeling of
absolute dependence. This allowed piety and spirituality to become normative rather than
creedal and propositional dogmatic statements.
The final option, the one Balthasar advocates, is to view spirituality and theology
as mutually beneficial. This approach can contain a wide variety of perspectives yet it is
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in many ways a return to the earlier style of the Church Fathers in which “the subsequent
separation of theology and spirituality was quite unknown to them.”215 But Balthasar is
too erudite a thinker to suggest that we can or should simply return to that earlier
mentality. In order to rightly rejoin spirituality and theology, it will take some
constructive work. To advance this cause, Balthasar argues that theology and spirituality
have to retrieve and explain anew “the objective spiritual medium” that was present in the
earlier eras of the Church’s history.216
Gospel as Norm
This “objective medium,” as Balthasar called it, is the gospel. The experience of
the gospel is the personal integration of God’s revelation. Through the spiritual journey,
the disciple discovers a deeper and more fundamental definition of self within the
narrative of God’s love in the Incarnation. The spiritual journey, anchored in the biblical
revelation and investigated through the discipline of theology, brings spirituality and
theology together within the depths of God’s revelation. There are two important
characteristics of the gospel: the hard sayings of Jesus and the proclamation of the good
news. They provide the normative test for all spiritual practices. This means that a
spirituality based on “good news” and “hard sayings” will retain a paradoxical
perspective. On the one hand, the Gospels portray the Christian journey as an easy yoke
and promise to liberate captives. On the other, Jesus asks the disciples to leave all they
have and share in Christ’s sufferings. The Christian is invited to follow Christ through
death on the Cross and into Resurrection. An authentic spirituality, then, will reflect this
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dramatic existence that connects in the participation of Christ both joy and suffering,
poverty and wealth, passivity and activity. The gospel is the narrative framework from
which theology, spirituality, and the formation of the self receive their meaning.217
Christians, following Balthasar’s model, “identify our ‘selves’ not with the isolated acts
and facts of our lives but with the meaning they come to represent in being narratively
interpreted. We can judge past and prospective actions in light of how they further or
weaken, enrich or impoverish, the self of one’s narrative identity.”218 In spirituality, the
Christian appropriates that narrative in order to subjectively adopt “a life story that is
genuinely meaningful and fulfilling” based on the biblical narrative.219
If the gospel is the unifying medium of theology and spirituality, then kenosis is
the primary motif that travels easily from the doctrine of God and the Incarnation into
spiritual practices and ethical perspectives. I will show throughout this chapter that for
Balthasar, kenosis is the link between the objectivity of the gospel and spiritual practice.
The gospel reveals the self-giving patterns of the triune God and then, through the Holy
Spirit, places these patterns within the human being, reshaping the previously amorphous
spiritual desire into a decisive form:
from now on the human (and a fortiori the Christian) spiritualities can no longer
be detached from the ultimate meaning that they have received in the form of
217
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revelation of Christ: from now on, there no longer exists an abstract general
concept for the various forms of spirituality (although it was possible earlier on
for such a general concept to exist only in a quite imperfect, analogous manner):
rather, their concrete and unique general concept is Jesus Christ, who bestows
their only acceptable specific meaning on them out of the unity of his triune
love.220
This quotation reveals some very concrete outcomes that keep Balthasar’s understanding
of kenosis from veering into the possibility of self-annihilation or an alienating
autonomy. The self-giving event of love, revealed in the Incarnation, becomes for
Balthasar a fulcrum that balances the extreme discourses of kenosis. In light of the
Incarnation, Balthasar distills four themes of a Christian spirituality of kenosis: the
philosophical presupposition of loving difference, kenotic spirituality as a scandal, the
enhancement of individual agency through personal mission, and the role of discernment
in the spiritual practice of self-surrender.
Philosophical Difference and the Spirituality of Kenosis
This revelatory event is grounded in the philosophical presupposition of
difference as the possibility for authentic love. Ontological difference between the divine
and human serves to strengthen and clarify the operation of kenosis and its relation to the
self: “It is absolutely not true that love requires the abolition of personality . . . how sad it
would be if it were to turn out that the beloved only possessed our measure and form!”221
The ontological difference between God and creatures (and between human beings) is the
fundamental safeguard for self-sacrifice that does not result in self-annihilation.222
Whatever is being asked of the disciple in the spiritual journey it is decidedly not, in
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Balthasar’s estimation, an exercise in self-annihilation. We are not asked to allow our
individual significance to be somehow absorbed into God. Instead we are invited to
participate with God in finding our own agency. The good news of the Gospel is real and
alive in Balthasar’s spirituality. We are being saved, not absorbed.
While philosophical difference might not seem to be a self-evident theme in the
Bible, Balthasar believes it is crucial. This relationship between theology, philosophy,
and spirituality is evident in that Balthasar’s discussion of the mystics of the Christian
church falls under the heading of Metaphysics in the Modern Age and “Metaphysics of
the Saints.”223 Without a proper understanding of God and metaphysics, spirituality will
degenerate any number of ways. In discussing the spiritual life, one must have a clear
sense of the way in which God and creature relate, and this involves certain philosophical
commitments. Even more, Balthasar mentions that metaphysics is crucial to
understanding the kenotic theme:
From Augustine via Benedict to Francis and Ignatius, this [yielding of self to
divine love] remains the primal truth which, though unchanging in its essence, is
constantly illumined in new ways. Nor can it stand indifferently beside
metaphysics with the latter’s question as to the transcendence of reason; rather, it
casts light on this very question and clarifies it from its own ultimate sublimity. 224
While this “primal truth” (which is simply the radical nature of Christian love) has
remained, it sometimes became obscured in various ways. One of the positive effects of
the Greek inheritance is that it encouraged eros and apatheia, a rigorous asceticism
coupled with an urgent desire to connect with God. Balthasar applauds these early
thinkers for keeping spirituality connected to theology. Indeed, Balthasar’s whole project
223
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of theological aesthetics is based on the beauty of God drawing and shaping our desires.
Yet one of the negative effects is that this cosmological approach leans toward the neoplatonic idea of absorption, which does not allow much room for the human spirit to
achieve freedom.
Balthasar affirms that Thomas Aquinas’s medieval synthesis marshaled the best
of Christian antiquity while providing the conceptual materials needed to construct the
real distinction between creature and Creator.225 Balthasar believes that Thomas’ reliance
on the doctrine of the Trinity for metaphysics is crucial:
The metaphysics of Thomas is thus the philosophical reflection of the free glory
of the living God of the Bible and in this way the interior completion of ancient
(and thus human) philosophy. It is a celebration of the reality of the real, of the all
embracing mystery of being which surpasses the powers of human thought, a
mystery pregnant with the very mystery of God, a mystery in which creatures
have access to participation in the reality of God, a mystery which in its
nothingness and non-subsistence is shot through with the light of the freedom of
the creative principle, of unfathomable love.226
The philosophical foundation for the difference between Persons of the Trinity ensures
that God’s freedom and love remain un-coerced in relation to each other and the world.
Thomas Aquinas’s metaphysics thus protects the very passion of God in his
unfathomable self-giving love.
In addition to divine freedom, Thomas’s philosophical distinction also preserves
creaturely love and freedom. According to Balthasar, the Creator’s relationship with
creatures “is modeled on the archetypal otherness within God” which brings about “a
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positive relationship to God.”227 Balthasar further asserts that Thomas’ trinitarianstructured metaphysics protects human flourishing. This allowance and celebration of
creaturely freedom found in Thomas
is beyond the imagination of any non-Christian religion” (including Judaism and
Islam), for wherever God (even in the person of Yahweh and Allah) can only be
the One, it remains impossible to discover any satisfactory explanation of the
Other. In these circumstances, philosophical reflection (which never truly
occurred in Judaism or Islam) inevitably conceives the world, in its otherness and
multiplicity, as a fall from the One, whose blessedness is only in itself.228
But Balthasar also takes Christianity to task, judging it guilty of ignoring Thomas’s
contribution and averring that this metaphysical lynchpin was lost by the inheritors of the
Thomistic legacy. Christian theology and spirituality ended up departing from Thomas’s
balance, resulting in in two dismal alternatives: placing reason over being (Scotus) or
continuing the univocal identification of God with being (Meister Eckhart).229 The legacy
of Scotus, Ockham, and Suarez inevitably end up leading to the emergence of Kantian
philosophy.230 The Kantian path privileges rationality and epistemology over the fullness
of being.
In considering Meister Eckhart (the other side of this polarity), Balthasar gives a
more mixed response.231 He sees Eckhart as an intensely radical Christian with authentic
experience and a commitment to the kenotic motif (expressed as Gelassenheit). But
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Eckhart’s prayerful and exuberant “worshipping heart” used philosophical and
theological language that may have been overly confident, which encourages others to
“misuse his words and insights for the purpose of its titanic idealism.”232 Balthasar’s
main problem with Eckhart is not with his use of Gelassenheit per se, but his tendency to
identify God with being leads to humanity becoming God themselves. Eckhart’s
authentic experiences are used by others that follow his trajectory to blur or destroy the
philosophical difference between Creator and creature. The real possibility of any
authentic spirituality of self-surrender becomes a threat to human autonomy, for it leads
to the flagrant promethean attempt at the dethronement of God.233
Consequently, for Balthasar, a poor understanding of philosophical difference is
not just a minor, forgivable intellectual defect. He perceives disastrous consequences for
any authentic vision of kenotic love.234 A metaphysics that can properly declare that God
is Wholly Other and yet is oriented toward his creation in self-giving love is a crucial
ingredient in the formulation of integrity and freedom of both God and creature. It is this
philosophical assertion that makes room for the possibility of a healthy form of self-
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surrender. In Balthasar’s estimation, the importance of this position has been
ineffectively grasped intermittently in the history of Christian thought. 235
The Scandal of the Gospel over Intellectual System
One possible misreading of Balthasar’s methodology would be to assume that he
is intent on laying a philosophical substrate on top of biblical revelation. But Balthasar
argues, in fact, for the opposite claim: the gospel, not philosophy, is what is normative.
This means, then, that Balthasar’s thought cannot achieve an easy synthesis of various
biblical, spiritual, or philosophical categories. To Balthasar this failure to achieve a
perfect working system is not a shortcoming to be corrected but an attribute to be praised.
Another way to express the Gospel’s role in Balthasar’s spiritual vision is through
the now-familiar theme of objective revelation over spiritual and ethical systems. The
Gospel is fundamentally disruptive to human patterns of spirituality just as the scandal of
the Incarnation and Cross disrupted religious belief systems. The Gospel is scandal. For
Balthasar, part of this scandal relates to the unprecedented nature of the kenotic act that
“forms the unique character of Jesus’s existence.” This unique kenotic character “cannot .
. . be traced back to anything that is already known,” which means that humanity has
difficulty receiving Jesus and he becomes continually a skandalon, a “‘stumbling
stone’”236
This normative scandal is exhibited in his essay on “The Gospel as Norm and
Critique of All Spirituality in the Church.”
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Were the gospel a philosophy of religion for Everyman, or an abstract ethics for
Everyman, then this hardness [of the gospel sayings] would be inappropriate. But
the inherent form of the gospel requires that man follow Jesus by staking
everything, with ultimate decisiveness, on the one card and abandoning the rest of
the card game: ‘leaving everything’ without looking back, without laying down as
a precondition a ‘synthesis’ between Jesus and saying farewell to those in one’s
home, between Jesus and burying one’s own father, or between Jesus and
anything else at all. . . . The criterion, the ‘canon,’ is that one does not make a
synthesis.237
Balthasar is saying that these hard gospel sayings cannot be properly integrated within an
ethical-spiritual system, for if the call of gospel is systematized, it makes the act of
abandoning family, for example, either universally applicable in everyone’s spiritual
journey or not applicable at all and merely illustrative. This approach to God would
mechanize the spiritual life. Either the disciple coldly detaches herself from her family in
an almost mechanized technique of self-redemption using self-emptying as a spiritual
tool to achieve salvation, or she continues on her way, rejecting any applicability of these
sayings as part of the good news of the gospel.
Spirituality, for Balthasar, is not a plan of action to accumulate worldly wealth
nor an attempt to somehow become something more than human. It is not an exercise in
developing your natural talents, nor is it a system of practices designed to destroy the
self. It is simply a choice to obey the disruptive word of God.238 Unlike in many other
versions of Christian journey, for Balthasar this choice occurs at the beginning of the
spiritual life. The process of “letting go” inherent in this choice is a form of kenotic
relinquishment of the illusion of human-created systems. Humanity, through the choice to

237

Balthasar, “The Gospel as Norm and Critique of All Spirituality in the Church,” 292.
Choice is a theme that Balthasar found in Ignatius of Loyola. For more information on choice,
Balthasar, and Ignatius, see Werner Löser, “The Ignatian Exercises in the Work of Hans Urs von
Balthasar,” in Hans Urs von Balthasar: His Life and Work, ed. David L. Schindler (San Francisco: Ignatius
Press, 1991), 103-120.
238

105

follow Jesus, reciprocates analogously God’s own making room for creation. In the
choice to follow after Jesus, the Christian makes space for God to define what humanity
should look like and relinquishes her definitions of human fulfillment and happiness in
exchange for God’s definitions.
Assenting to this invitation and opening oneself to have the form of Christ define
you is not without effort. It is a death to an old web of meaning and a rebirth into a new
one. Hence, the beginning of the journey has a negative, even painful, aspect to it. It is a
true renunciation, a loss of moderating viewpoints not only about God, but also one’s
understanding of the world, others, and the self. The spiritual journey begins in this
thicket and the path can only be found “as a result of deliberate and perhaps wearying
effort.”239 Instead of a passive “letting be,” Balthasar envisions that the kenotic activity of
discipleship is something “which is to be actively grasped and carried out [and] must also
be actively pursued.”240 The active choice to follow Christ is a major feature of
Balthasar’s approach to spirituality.
Balthasar discusses the differences between the Rhineland mystics and Ignatius of
Loyola to develop his idea of choice in the beginning of the spiritual life. What is made
evident in Balthasar’s discussion of the Rhineland mystics and Ignatius of Loyola: “For
the Rhineland mystics, abandonment came in at the end; Ignatius transfers it to the
beginning.”241 In the Rhineland mystics, the implication is that self-abandonment is a
mystical event or goal, an attempt to achieve a type of union with God.
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Two important consequences follow from locating spiritual abandonment at the
beginning. First, this keeps Balthasar’s use of self-surrender motifs connected to
voluntary concrete actions in the pursuit of obedience. Kenotic activity is a process in
which we are invited to participate with God for the sake of ourselves and for others. In
the Ignatian way, choice and kenotic activity are linked with the immediate participation
in God through mission. This gives Christian discipleship a continual sense of God’s
presence and invites the disciple to be involved in the practice of self-surrender under the
directive of the Holy Spirit.
The second consequence of placing kenotic abandonment at the beginning is
associated with choice. Balthasar highlights the way spirituality is fundamentally
disruptive to human attempts at creating a system of self-salvation and is based on faith,
arguing that:
being carried out of oneself—which is faith, and is brought about by the love of
Christ—is nothing else than a clearing of space in oneself for this love, a
determination of one’s own existence, which allows itself to be conformed to the
existence of the crucified in such a way ‘that our inclusion in the life of Christ
does not only give us an outward direction, but penetrates us from within’.242
At the outset of Balthasar’s spirituality is a decision to allow God to define reality and,
through that, accept what God has for each individual, be it pain or pleasure, in the
confidence that, through it all, God will bring the individual into a heightened sense of
the real, including a more intense and empowered existence as a human being.
When viewed through the lenses of the scandal of the gospel and the
abandonment of self-assessment, Christian perfection is relegated to the background of
the spiritual journey. The task at the beginning of the spiritual journey is a choice to
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reject these notions: “It is readiness as sacrifice—because Christian perfection consists in
placing oneself at the disposal of God’s entire will and renouncing one’s own choice of a
way of life.”243 Many spiritualities attempt to describe the Christian journey as an ascent
to perfection. For Balthasar, perfection is already given at the outset as grace:
Thus the soul in grace does not live in a state of indigence advancing toward
fullness, but in a state of fullness radiating out into the poverty and darkness of
this world . . . . All that was said about the essential constitution of the finite has
become or the moment of no importance; for the just man lives by faith, that is, by
the gift of eternal life. His acts are performed not as part of his striving toward
perfection, but as proceeding from perfection.244
The effect of this change in perspective is difficult to underestimate. It virtually
eliminates a self-conscious scrutiny of activity and emotions, placing the focus on
contemplating the gift-giving God.245 In this schema, the Christian begins the journey to
God from a place of thankfulness and blessing, not human insufficiency, desire, or aching
need.
Balthasar’s commitment to the scandalous nature of Christian spirituality and the
rejection of a human-defined idea of perfection is what leads him to explore the tradition
of the holy fool.246 The saints, as important as they are to Balthasar, suffer from a
misinterpretation over the centuries. They become classified as heroes and become
“separate candidates for sanctity from the existence of ordinary mortals.247 When heroism
dominates the saintly narratives, the result is either to view grand acts of heroism as the
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measure of the Christian life or to see the life of holiness as unattainable for the average
Christian. Both of these problems are caused by human beings attempting to quantify and
commodify the spiritual life.
So, where should Christians look to find an example of radical Christian existence
without the desire for measurement? Following the “Metaphysics of the Saints,”
Balthasar delves into the stories of Parzival, Don Quixote, Prince Myshkin of
Dostoyevsky’s novel The Idiot, and the paintings of Georges Rouault. There is no single
form of folly: sometimes it takes the form of a wisdom that is beyond this world,
sometimes it is represented as a learned ignorance, sometimes it is used to represent the
simple, the uneducated.248 The diversity of holy fools appeals to Balthasar’s
understanding of mission and the uniqueness of each persons role in God’s drama.
But the archetype of the fool is particularly important for this study, not only
because of the diversity of its manifestation but also because, in the retelling of the saint,
a simple obedience and kenotic relinquishment (the central practices of true Christian
spirituality) are often overshadowed in favor of the miraculous and heroic. In the
narrative of the fool, the radical nature of kenosis, of letting all concern of reputation and
human assessment fall away in simple yet outlandish decisions to love. The fool “can
approach people no longer moved by fossilised forms of piety. This form of life is
explicitly described as lying beyond apatheia, indeed as a crossing of the frontier of the
measure proper to human nature.”249 When Balthasar describes the fool as “lying beyond
apatheia,” he means that the fool, while echoing the motifs of kenosis that lie with the
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Greek worldview, moves beyond the measurements of that system into a deeper realm:
“He stands nearest to the saint, often nearer than the morally successful man preoccupied
with his perfection.”250 The fool is not meant to replace the saint, but to recover that
element of saintliness that Christianity has too quickly glossed over.
A particularly poignant example of the misrepresentation of sanctity for Balthasar
can be found in Don Quixote. This story challenged the conventional appreciation of “the
ideology of the heroic and gallant Christian knight . . . as the living analogy of the saint in
his supernatural struggle for the Kingdom of God.”251 Yet, while making a mockery out
of that idealized form of piety, Cervantes “was fully aware that it would be precisely in
his hero that this out-of-date existence would survive as immortal foolishness. While Don
Quixote is ‘no Christ-figure,’ it is precisely in his failure that Don Quixote “becomes the
true patron saint of Catholic Action.”252 He “constantly preaches and practises love of
enemies . . . . He preaches love on every occasion.”253 The simple perseverance of Don
Quixote, his fidelity to poverty, chastity, and obedience juxtaposed with the spectacular
failures of his actions reveal the depth of kenotic love in a unique way. “In short, Don
Quixote is so much better a Christian because subjectively he makes no claim to sanctity,
and because objectively it is never possible, at any moment or in any respect to count his
ridiculous doings among the solemn deeds of God and Jesus Christ.”254 In sum, a type of
self-surrender that is imbued with the foolishness of love motivates the fool in his purest
form. In refusing to be measured, either by himself or by others, the fool is directly
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combating the absorption and autonomy perspectives of spirituality. The fool is always
well aware that he is not God and is not attempting to eradicate his creaturely identity. He
is not seeking to erase his foolishness, only to expose it humbly to the free benevolence
of God.
Another slightly different implication of Balthasar’s spirituality, especially in
light of his reluctance to embrace a systematizing approach, is the question of human
agency. The language of Christian perfection discussed above tends to entail within the
Christian community a focus on individual holiness. The affirmation of human agency,
while similar, is used in philosophical and theological circles to describe a general set of
external conditions in which a human being is able to make free choices. Questions of
human agency often come along with discourses on the nature of justice, community, and
human rights.
The themes of universal human rights and social justice simply do not capture the
imagination of Balthasar. He is so strongly attracted to the scandal and particularity of
Christian revelation that his approach seems awkward and unusable for those intent upon
securing universal human rights, dignity, or equality for the oppressed. Balthasar has no
sense of urgency about creating clear progress toward equality and just societies, at least
in terms of a universal language. However, it does not necessarily follow that Balthasar
does not care about these aspects of life. The next two sections, on mission and
discernment, offer a way to illustrate what rises up from the destruction of human
systems and how Balthasar constructs a new answer to what human agency might mean.
Mission and Human Agency
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It is essential to revisit the theme of mission to understand how Balthasar’s
kenotic emphases interact with human agency. Chapter two discussed mission as it
relates to Jesus as both human and divine but Balthasar also uses mission to describe
human patterns of spirituality. Balthasar argues that “a human individual becomes a
person, theologically, by being given a unique vocation and mission.”255 In fact, the
deepest, most profound, most essential element of humanity is mission:
All aspects of man’s creaturehood meet in the concept of mission: his mission to
love and to serve, because love fulfills itself in service just as service fulfills itself
in love; his distance from God and his nearness to God, because his condition as
not-God finds its foundation and fulfillment in his condition of being at a remove
from love, as the Son also experienced it is in his relationship with the Father,
whereas his nearness to God reveals itself as a nearness of love and hence also of
reverence and of service; his call to autonomous action and self-giving
contemplation, because his action can be more autonomous as his contemplation
is more self-giving and receptive, whereas his contemplation finds its purest
expression when it is translated into action. Thus the concept of mission suffices
to express the full measure of what man is; fulfillment of mission encompasses
the whole concept of human perfection. It even replaces it, since human
perfection is not in itself self-sufficient and purposeful; it stands in the service of
the glorification of the love of the Trinity, which is the single ultimate purpose of
creation and to which everything else has been ordered, including man’s
perfection and his eternal happiness.256
Note how Balthasar insists that every aspect of what humanity means coincides with
mission. All the questions raised in this study—self-surrender, human fulfillment,
autonomy, agency, conscience, Christian perfection, suffering, and joy—all are deeply
present within this fundamental category of mission.
More precisely, then, mission is the dramatic transition from being an individual
into being a theological person. Balthasar uses the term “individual” to refer to the
natural state of humanity, the commonality all human beings share. An individual
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achieves personhood through accepting and enacting his or her mission. As an
ontological encounter mission comes directly from God to the individual. The implication
here is that mission is not something that arises out of a constellation of natural talents;
mission cannot be discovered by doing an inventory of strengths and weakness. Mission
is the call of the gospel applied uniquely to each individual, with the intention of turning
that individual into an empowered person in the deepest possible way. It is a specific and
unrepeatable calling particular to every human being.
This understanding of mission also serves to guide and structure kenotic activity.
The category of mission is so important that “even the factor of Christian mortification to
the world stands under the more comprehensive sign of mission.”257 Mortification is a
descriptive term for the kenotic motif in spirituality. In other words, the kenosis theme is
sometimes made subordinate to mission because mission brings about personhood in a
more comprehensive manner. The activity of self-surrender and the degree of selfsurrender will be different for each individual as he or she responds to and internalizes
the story of the self that his or her mission offers. So mission is an all-encompassing term
that opens up the possibility for the negative connotations of self-sacrifice to be related to
the larger themes of self-discovery and agency.
One possible concern about Balthasar’s conceptions of agency, mission, kenosis,
and personhood could be that kenotic spirituality cannot support a positive conception of
self-love because it advocates self-surrender. If self-love is a necessary part of human
flourishing and Balthasar’s kenotic spirituality denies self-love, then it could be argued
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that Balthasar sabotages his manifest goal of human flourishing by denying self-love.
Daphne Hampson, for example, argues that, while kenosis is an acceptable practice for
men, it is damaging to women because they do not have a sense of self in the first
place.258 There are two extreme views of self-love that need to be addressed to avoid
absorption or autonomy. On the one hand, if self-love is rejected as tantamount to pride
or egoism, it would seem that Christian spirituality would fall into the absorption mode of
spirituality. Christian asceticism then becomes a vehicle for hatred of creaturely finitude.
Carried to its full completion, this perspective becomes a vehicle for the destruction of
the self—both spiritually and physically.
On the other extreme, if self-love becomes the arbiter of meaning for the
definition of self, freedom, and love, then the Christian becomes closed off to
experiencing love through others to the extent that human flourishing is defined by the
individual rather than God or the community. The invitation to participate in God-gifted
mission is lost and replaced by self-interest. Ironically, extreme self-love (egoism) results
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in death of the self or disempowerment, even while those who follow this path see
themselves as increasing in autonomy and power.
The ethicist Darlene Fozard Weaver recognizes these two extremes. It is not
enough to merely accept self-love as part of the Christian life, but one must understand its
relation to other forms of love: “love for God, self, and neighbor are dynamically interrelated. The costs of failing to note these inter-relations are high. Unduly separating them
risks the misconstruing them as competing objects of love.”259 As Weaver implies then,
self-love cannot be considered apart from loving relationships with God and neighbor.
Speculatively speaking, while Balthasar might agree with Weaver about the
interconnectedness of the various forms of love, any attempt at promoting self-love is
problematic for him for three reasons. First, because Balthasar stands solidly within the
Christian tradition, he recognizes and affirms that the basic definitions of sin center upon
pride and that self-love can easily spill over into something more sinister.260 He is
hesitant to grant space to self-love lest it turn into egoism, which makes self-interest the
normative guide of conduct. Thus, a theological approach that formalizes self-love runs
the risk of disrupting the balance between God and creature that was established in the
Incarnation.
Balthasar’s second concern about any privileging of self-love is that it is, in the
end, untrustworthy and does not always lead to actual human flourishing: “Faith means to
remain in perpetual contact with the source and to have no desire to seek one’s own
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adventure. The greatest adventure after all is God’s redeeming action for the world in his
Son, and if we follow the Son’s course we shall not run the risk of losing ourselves on the
slippery paths of self-inverted love.”261 Self-love, when overemphasized, ends up
betraying the self, seeking its own adventure, its own way to achieve flourishing based on
its own desires.
The third reason that Balthasar is hesitant to emphasize self-love is because he
simply believes personhood and true human flourishing is found in a network of
relationships. Self-love simply loses all importance as a term “when I learn (in the Son)
that I am a ‘good’ to him, affirmed by him; this is what guarantees my being and my
freedom. It is only when I learn that I represent a ‘good’ and a ‘thou’ to God that I can
fully trust in the imparted gift of being and freedom and so, affirmed from and by
eternity, really affirm myself too.”262 In light of God’s objective pronouncement of our
worth, the idea of self-love seems insignificant. In the end, self-love simply feels too
individualistic and small to be of any use. True self-love is a byproduct of that moment
when we truly understand what we mean to God. What Balthasar contends is that, within
this kenotic spiritual framework, our identity is not threatened by the other, but realized
in “a ‘we’ that transcends” self-love completely.263
Yet, if Balthasar contradicts or denigrates self-love, then he has also violated his
principle of ontological difference; this would result in a universalizing of self-sacrifice.
Weaver believes that, without a positive understanding of self-love, Christianity “may
encourage unmitigated sacrifice on behalf of the neighbor, a sacrifice that mutilates the
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identity of the person and does a disservice to the neighbor as well. As a contemporary
account of self-love makes clear, to construe God, self, and neighbor as competing
objects of love establishes false oppositions among them.”264 Self-hatred would
undertake spiritual activity with the motivation of self destruction. This activity could
mimic, at least superficially, the heroic deeds of the martyr or charity toward the neighbor
but it would be, on the whole, motivated by hatred of self. Balthasar’s theology, though,
would never advocate a mutilation of the person in self-sacrifice. Even with self-love
remaining in the background it is simply not the case that his theology mutilates the
human form. The trinitarian love and the Incarnation provide an alternative emphasis to
self-love that prevents such a problem from arising. Balthasar can acknowledge the
importance of self-love, yet he can acknowledge its very real dangers as well. Self-love
alone is never the answer to the problem of achieving human agency.
In short, while Balthasar acknowledges the presence of a positive self-love and its
role in our spiritual lives, he does not believe that there is any need to emphasize it.
Instead it is to remain “unaccented” lest it turns into something more dangerous.265 This
area of Balthasar’s theology needs more development. Balthasar does not formally deny
the reality of self-love and, indeed, his concern for ontological difference would seem to
support creaturely self-regard. Yet it seems as if he could have done more to explain how
self-love is a positive aspect of the Christian life instead of leaving it unaccented.
Overall, however, Balthasar’s reluctance to make use of the terminology of selflove frees the human person from looking inward to pursue God. In leaving behind a
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preoccupation with self in exchange for a personalizing mission, Christian spirituality, in
Balthasar’s approach, offers an opportunity for a deeper vision of individual agency.
Each person will have a different path toward fulfillment, a different way of freely
expressing that common imprint of Christ. As Balthasar states:
the personal ‘idea’ of each individual finite freedom lies in the incarnate Son in
such a way that each is given a unique participation in the Son’s uniqueness. His
divinity, with its infinite freedom, permits this inexhaustible multiplication of
what is once-for-all and unique; thus it also permits each individual freedom to
fulfill itself in an utterly distinct manner within the realm of infinite freedom.266
God has an “idea” and “name” for each one and has shaped beforehand a path to full
agency for that person. This allows for a great deal of freedom in the spiritual journey.
While admittedly the spiritual life is saturated in the life of Jesus Christ and must be
shaped by him, what each follower does in a concrete situation could potentially be very
different based on the leading of the Father in love. This model of spirituality gives
context to Balthasar’s theology and is, on the whole, overlooked by many commentators
that are unconvinced of his project.
Discernment
Thus far I have argued that Balthasar’s theology and spirituality are linked
organically through the encounter with the gospel. This allows for the consideration of
the trinitarian and Christological elements of kenosis to flow into Balthasar’s spirituality.
The gospel itself, as good news and hard sayings, prevents us from creating a system of
progress that leads us to our own definitions of happiness and fulfillment. Inversely, it
also precludes a system of relinquishments, self-sacrifices, and sufferings as inherent in
Christian holiness. Instead, we are invited to relinquish judgments and live in a kenotic
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state of indifference. The appreciation for mission provides Balthasar with a way of
discussing the positive nature of the human spirit in his discourse on spirituality. Mission
safeguards all that is valuable about the creature from alternative forms of spiritual
journeys that end in dissolution of the person or alienation from the rest of humanity.
This final section will elaborate how Balthasar might see mission played out
throughout the life of the Christian through the idea of discernment, or more specifically,
discernment as the idea of living out mission. Without discernment, the kenotic elements
of spirituality, even within the category of mission, would become oppressive. For
Balthasar, “the metaphysics of indifference” is foremost “a doctrine of discernment”
because a thoroughly Christian instantiation of indifference is always ordered toward “the
personal decrees of the Holy Spirit.”267 When the disciple follows after Christ in a spirit
of abandonment or disponibilité she is primarily in a state of active listening, a readiness
to enact the very truths of God in her own life.268 Balthasar believes this perspective on
emptying avoids the rigidity of the Greek and Asian techniques of self-emptying, which
extinguish the self rather than preparing the self for action and empowerment.
There are many activities and attitudes that develop this ability to be available to
the personal decrees of the Spirit. Yet, Balthasar, like Barth, wanted to avoid techniques
of simple progression in the spiritual life. In other words, the process of spiritual
discernment seeks out ways to mute our own clamoring fears or desires and to recognize
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God’s call. In relation especially to self-sacrifice, discernment will be absolutely crucial
as a qualifying tool to aid Christians in the employment of kenosis in their lives. As I
have noted above, the Christian obedience to the gospel involves hard sayings and good
news. Or, in Melanie Barrett’s more experiential interpretation:
attunement to Christ instills two dispositions in the believer, one unpleasant,
arduous and difficult, and the other joyful, hopeful, and trusting . . . . For the
believer, this unity of dispositions, one positive and one negative, results in a
variegated emotional life, one that alternates between joy and suffering, between
felt nearness to God and felt distance from God, and between exuberance and
dejection.269
Balthasar’s spirituality is suffused with drama. We experience the gamut of life, and any
spirituality must validly embrace that, especially if this Christian life is to be based on
Jesus’s life and ministry. In discernment, the Christian learns to respond to God in the
midst of these dispositions, either to embrace joy or pain. Balthasar makes the following
point about how Jesus used discernment:
When is it time for Jesus to hide from his enemies and avoid them, and when is it
time to confront them and surrender into their hands? He knows these times by
always looking to the Father . . . . In making the decisions required by the needs
of the hour, the Christian and the Church must ponder and reflect, of course: but
at the same time they must look up to the obedient Son with humble entreaty, so
that, through him, they may find the will of God here and now.270
In this passage Balthasar’s nuanced and subtle approach to self-surrender has Jesus
leaving all his activity up to the Father. This underlying disposition is kenotic, yet, in
terms of concrete situations, kenosis can appear either as a confrontation or as a
surrender. It is not automatically one or the other, underscoring the fact that Balthasar
does not see authentic spirituality as a passive resignation to suffering or oppression.
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Indeed, Balthasar is not offering the Christian a life only of suffering and death
and obedience. These things are never goods in themselves; rather, they are determined to
be the appropriate action undertaken in love, if and when the Holy Spirit prompts it. On
the other hand, Balthasar refuses to base his entire spirituality on the idea of liberation or
emancipation. In Balthasar’s lifetime, liberation theology was in its beginning stages. He
recognized many good things within the spirit of early liberation theology but his main
concern was that if liberation theology focuses solely on fighting structural injustice, it
could miss the possibility that God might be asking for a different response.271
Balthasar focuses on a number of spiritual activities that support a mature ability
to discern right action. Two that I wish to highlight in light of my project are a
contemplative reading of the scriptures and participation in the Eucharist. These two
practices bring “what pertains to the Son” through “the work of the Spirit to form the
mystical body of Christ by spiritually universalizing the historical Christ.”272 The kenotic
disposition is present in Balthasar’s approach to reading Scripture contemplatively.273
The Christian does not go to the Bible in search of a specific answer, but to learn how to
listen:
The Christian contemplates holy scripture, not insofar as it is man’s word, but as
God’s word . . . for scripture is not some systematic wisdom: it is an account of
God’s meeting with men . . . in contemplating scripture we learn how to listen
properly, and this listening is the original wellspring of all Christian life and
prayer.274
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This act of contemplating scripture places us in communication with the Divine. Yet, in
Balthasar’s typical fashion, communication with the Divine is a thoroughly human
process. Because of the Incarnation our interactions with God can never leave the
physical, creaturely world behind. The senses and the imagination become very important
in the process of discernment and especially in approaching scripture.275 “In
contemplation, just as we can never leave the Lord’s humanity behind us, neither can we
get ‘beyond’ the word in its human form. It is in the humanity that we find God, in the
world of sense that we find the Spirit.”276 Balthasar asks the Christian to “be in the stable
at Bethlehem . . . go along on the flight into Egypt . . . place an order with Jesus the
carpenter . . . and so on.”277 The ability to discern right actions now comes from a
constant immersion in the scriptures, forming our imaginations through the Holy Spirit,
who shows us the will of the Father.278
The Eucharist is another important practice for spiritual discernment. The
Eucharist is a vital step in the progression of the kenotic motif begun in the Incarnation.
Balthasar provocatively claims that “only the Eucharist really completes the
Incarnation.”279 The Eucharist extends the kenotic economy into the very hearts and souls
of humanity in a sacramental manner.280 It is the “closest approach to God”281As Kevin
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Mongrain has argued so well, Balthasar is not necessarily interested in abstract
explanations of the Eucharist but more in the actual reception of it, accepting the mystery
surrounding it.282 It is a mystical enactment of the kenosis of God through Christ for the
enrichment of the disciple who, in giving thanks for God’s kenosis, offers up a selfsharing love toward others and back to God.
The Eucharist, since it is an extension of the kenotic economy, offers Christians a
way to place themselves in the drama with Christ. In this manner we take up, with Christ,
a eucharistic, self-giving attitude toward the Father, since “the Eucharist is directed to
God the Father.”283 Not only does the body of Christ mystically nourish us and restore the
Christian to spiritual health but, in participation of the Eucharist, the Christian takes on
Jesus’s own kenotic attitude of love toward the Father. This watchful and thankful
posture toward the Father is the beginning of discernment.
One final comment is important to understand discernment’s place in the interplay
of a kenotic spirituality: interpersonal human relations. Balthasar’s kenotic vision of
reality will need to engage concrete situations in life if it is to be meaningful for
Christians. One way to address this relationship between persons is with ethical
reflection, i.e., normative guidance or principles that a person can then apply to various
situations in order to ensure certain values are respected and upheld. In the ethical arena,
how would a person, shaped by the kenotic love of God, discern right actions toward a
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neighbor? If kenosis forms the foundation for all relationships, then Balthasar can argue
that “the Son’s self-surrender is the most definite reality possible, and every ethical norm
governing man’s concrete action (individually and socially) is only the proclaiming of
this infinite will of God for a finite situation.”284 This is a demanding ethical code “where
the thought of necessity, justice, and the thought of balanced settlement cease.”285 It is
impossible to overemphasize the theme of excessive love in Balthasar’s theology, and it
is especially crucial for understanding his view of ethics. Love is a required element in all
forms of kenotic activity but Balthasar allows for radical kenosis to be moderated by the
concrete realities of the moment:
One can permit self-giving in good conscience only when one is ready, for one’s
own part, to give freely without counting the cost. On this spiritual level, the good
stands as norm over the giver as well as the [sic.] over the recipient (but who is
also ready for his part to be given in return), and it governs the free consciences of
both.286
I interpret this quotation to be an admission that, if we are not able to give freely or with
full knowledge, we are in a potentially dangerous situation. Self-sacrifice is not a good in
itself that justifies the violation of our consciences. It takes place within a personal
encounter, primarily with God, who directs us and guides us. While we model our lives
off of the radical love of God we also need to discern in practical terms how to approach
any given situation:
The Christian is fundamentally a man who has been dispossessed. He lives for
God and his fellow men because he knows that he is not the author of his own existence;
thus, in gratitude for his life, he must lead a life of thanksgiving. He gladly does what he
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can and gives what he has. In practical terms there is probably a limit to this openness to
God and our fellowmen: we need a personal area in which to recharge our batteries so
that we can return to the field of action and expend ourselves once again. But spirituality
and existentially this openness has no limits.”287
So, while he feels the Christian remains fundamentally open to self-giving,
Balthasar also acknowledges our creaturely finitude. The human subject needs to
recognize the times when he or she needs to withdraw. This is not selfishness or egoism;
it is healthy self-love and also love for the other. These admissions, though, are
relatively sparse. Balthasar does not often call for moderation, for the recharging of
batteries, or withdrawal from self-sacrifice. In fact, it is the opposite. Usually he pushes
the extremes of self-sacrifice, encouraging Christians to continually and meaningfully
divest themselves of everything. The imbalance in his work is sometimes problematic
and leads to misunderstandings. In attempting to show the limitless power of kenotic
love, Balthasar often forgets to qualify his statements. This can make him appear guilty
of promoting a form of self-annihilation, when really it is a confidence in the divine
grace of God and his ultimate goal for all people to walk in the full power of kenotic
relations.
Conclusion
Balthasar’s spirituality and theology are connected to the objective medium of the
gospel. The kenotic patterns found in the gospel become the normative and objective
pattern for the spiritual journey. The elements of Balthasar’s spirituality described within
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this chapter were the necessity of philosophical difference, the rejection of spiritual and
ethical systems in favor of the scandal of the gospel, the promotion of individualizing
mission as the central feature of spirituality, and the role of discernment in helping the
Christian navigate the difficulties of human relationships in a sinful world. The idea of
self-sacrifice, in light of these emphases, becomes nuanced; Balthasar is always careful to
maintain the delicate balance between the hard sayings and sufferings that the Christian
life entails alongside the liberation, joy, freedom that Christ offers. This answer may not
satisfy all those who see kenosis as an oppressive mechanism that denigrates the self. Yet
Balthasar offers an alternative vision in which kenosis is the only way to achieve true
agency. He rejects common forms of measuring agency in favor of the radical nature of
love that the Gospel demands.
This study has traced the meaning of kenosis within Balthasar’s corpus. I have
argued that kenotic love is a comprehensive and normative theme that Balthasar employs
in all the main areas of his writings. I have also shown that he intentionally employs
kenosis, grounded in divine love, to preserve creaturely agency. I described how
Balthasar sees the problem of sin damaging humanity’s relationship with God and other
humans. In Balthasar’s understanding, human systems of religion other than Christianity
responded in two possible extreme ways. The first used kenosis without love to annihilate
the self. This religious impulse was often accompanied by a metaphysical belief that the
goal of the spiritual journey was an absorption of the self into the divine. The other
response, in reaction to the destruction in the first extreme, rejected kenosis as a spiritual
pattern and understood the divine as a competitor for true agency. This response is an
attempt to secure freedom by taking power. I argued that, for Balthasar, this dilemma was
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solved in the Incarnation, which restored kenosis to the proper home within triune love,
and that, through that restoration, kenosis was revealed to be a vehicle for pursuing a
personalizing mission for each and every human being.
For Balthasar, true kenosis is never the obliteration of the self in an ontological
sense but only in the sense of an abasement toward the Divine in love. Were God himself
not loving, this would jeopardize the creature’s ability to achieve agency. This is why the
Incarnation has a central position in Balthasar’s theology. He understands the Incarnation
as a definitive act of love from God that establishes, once and for all, that human beings
need not strive for some type of godlike autonomy; that their very finitude is of deep
value.
In relationship to the Incarnation I discussed how Balthasar’s particular
connection of Christology with drama and spirituality opened up a new fertile ground for
the motif of kenosis. Since Balthasar believed the Incarnation was the definitive
revelation of the divine life, Balthasar deduced that the trinitarian life itself must be
kenotic in nature as well. This primal kenosis within the Trinity shapes Balthasar’s
metaphysics and ultimately provides the framework from which he works out a pattern in
which God’s freedom and agency do not conflict with human agency but presuppose the
possibility of accepting every free act of creatures from a standpoint of love. This divine
self-giving love, when impressed upon the human being, provides a mission, a way to
become more than a single individual and become a theological person within the
community of saints.
The kenotic theme is widely acknowledged in the secondary literature as an
important component of Balthasar’s theology, but there is not a sustained treatment of the
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subject.288 This full-length study of kenosis offers a thematic entrance into Balthasar’s
works. It provides a fresh way of understanding the main themes of Balthasar’s thought.
Second, there is an interest in the idea of kenosis in postmodern constructive
theologies.289 The kenotic motif appears to offer postmodern theologians the ability to
avoid some of the grasping for power that they see operating in modern theology. The
human desire for a system and epistemological certainty produced theologies that ignored
the dark side of human culture (sin) and were also closed off toward the wildness of
biblical revelation (grace). In particular, philosophers and theologians such as Oliver
Davies, Graham Ward, Emmanuel Levinas, Edith Wyschogord, and Jean Luc-Marion
have all taken up kenotic themes in their own theologies and philosophies. Balthasar is an
important conversation partner for those continuing to consider kenosis in postmodern
theology.
Third, this study answers the concern in the various “theologies of liberation” that
focusing on kenosis as a definitive descriptor for the spiritual life means encouraging
disempowered and marginalized people to remain in bondage.290 Balthasar, I have
argued, clearly makes use of the kenotic motif with the intent of preserving human
agency—which may include seeking liberation—and his thought offers a corrective to a
particular strand of postmodernism that discards kenotic expression completely. His
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usage of discernment and mission in spirituality provides a space in which kenotic
practice could be a spiritually appropriate response to oppression and injustice.
Balthasar’s powerful and creative approach to kenosis is both theologically rich
and spirituality sensitive. While some aspects of his thought are perhaps overstated and
others unaccented, his work offers theologians a wealth of possibilities for the careful and
powerful usage of the radical self-offering of God and the radical calling to self-giving
discipleship that the gospel portrays.
I began this dissertation by placing Balthasar’s kenosis within the context of the
contemporary problem of human agency. I highlighted some of the challenges that came
from feminist discourse about the topic. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, a pioneer in American
feminism, famously said, “Self-development is a higher duty than self-sacrifice.” This
sense that self-development and self-sacrifice are at odds with each other is a significant
theme in contemporary culture and also in particular, within feminist discourse. In
Christian discourse, when this feminist sentiment appropriately labels abusive power
structures within Christian rhetoric, the idea of self-development being antithetical to
self-sacrifice critiques spiritualities that focus on self-sacrifice as being patriarchal. In the
introduction I mentioned the work of Daphne Hampson as one example. There is indeed
an element of this quotation that rings true for those who find themselves victims of the
powerful in a way that threatens agency. But what I think I’ve shown in Balthasar’s
writings is that agency and self-sacrifice are not mutually exclusive but mutually enhance
one another.
In what follows, I wish to offer a cursory speculative envoi to the dissertation by
suggesting possible connections between Balthasar’s theology and others who make use
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of kenosis in the contemporary situation. The purpose of this speculative process is not to
be exhaustive or even representative. It is merely an exercise in speculation on how
Balthasar’s work might interact with more contemporary voices that could assist
Christian theologians and ethicists as they make use of kenotic language.
In Saints and Postmodernism the Jewish philosopher, Edith Wyschogrod, argues
that in the postmodern situation, moral philosophy must take its cue from the narrative
lives of saints that practice “radical altruism.”291 Wyschogrod believes that moral theory
at its best is a deeply deficient tool to produce ethical action in our contemporary
situation. At its worst, moral theory is susceptible to being used to inscribe violence and
power into a grand narrative of “reason” that obscures radical altruism.292
If moral theory obscures radical altruism it is the saint that reveals its allure and
motivates concrete moral action. Wyschogrod believes that saintly lives are to be
interpreted not according to a “normative discourse . . . but much more like interpreting a
musical theme.”293 Balthasar, too, has his love of musical references yet this is more than
just a passing comment. For both Wyschogrod and Balthasar, the musical theme hints at a
moral requirement, something that is not just to be intellectually assimilated on the
theoretical level, but performed. Moral theory by itself tends to lack this allure to act
morally. The narratives of the saints provide this moral invitation that grasps the human
being, not merely at an intellectual level, but at a performative level.
Both Wsychogrod and Balthasar desire to move beyond traditional hagiographical
methods of interpreting saintly lives and both see the saint primarily in terms of a
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powerful activity of self-donation. Balthasar refers this activity of self-donation by many
names throughout his work but the notions of kenotic love, self-surrender and selfsacrifice are the predominant themes. Wyschogrod deems it “radical altruism.”294
Wyschogrod distinguishes her view from the “common sense” view of altruism.
Common sense altruism is in danger of seeing the Other as a way to fulfill the self’s
desires. The practice of common sense altruism in results in hierarchical modes, for
example, helping close relatives first over those with greater need.295 This criticism of
common sense altruism contains parallels Balthasar’s own scant usage of self-love within
his kenotic framework. The common sense usage of altruism is ordered by some measure
of self-interest. If that self-interest becomes the driving force of self-sacrifice, then the
relationship with the Other (God or human) is merely instrumental in the self’s grasping
for wholeness. Wyschogrod forcefully states that “social theories do not measure
altruism but altruism measures social theories.”296 This is a serious challenge to those
who wish for a more measured interpretation of self-sacrifice that fits within a larger
social theory. Balthasar and Wyschogrod are both extremely careful in preventing that
from happening in their own work and instead demand a radical form of moral action.
Yet there is a significant difference between the two thinkers. Wyschogrod
reduces the saintly life to the practice of radical altruism and jettisons the spiritual,
theological, and mystical contexts in which these saints operated. Take, for example,
Wyschogrod’s definition of saint:
one whose adult life in its entirety is devoted to the alleviation of sorrow (the
psychological suffering) and pain (the physical suffering) that afflicts other
294
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persons without distinction of rank or group or, alternatively, that afflicts sentient
beings, whatever the cost to the saint in pain or sorrow. On this view theistic
belief may but need not be a component of a saint’s belief system.297
This definition has similarities to Balthasar’s conception of sainthood. Saints are willing
to suffer for the sake of others. In Christian terms, saints are even willing to be damned
for others. But Wyschogrod’s claim that the act of self-sacrifice can be divorced from the
belief system of the saint would be problematic for Balthasar. The reason the saint
undertakes the life of self-emptying is because of their beliefs, and the divine protects
that act of self-surrender with his own prior act. To claim that theological motivations are
superfluous to understanding radical altruism appears reductionistic.
In addition, many saints did not always attempt to alleviate the pain of others but
instead to find a connection to God within their pain. Wyschogrod’s focus on alleviating
pain seems too simplistic; her sense of psychological or spiritual pain is a right and true
admonishment. It is certainly not necessary to have a theological justification for selfsurrender, but it is a significant type of motivator for a large number of saints and,
historically speaking, the cultivation of saints has occurred within theistic contexts.
Wyschogrod divorces mystical language from the language of altruism. Her
dismissiveness of the mystical and theological in saintly lives obscures the activity of the
Divine kenosis which inspired them. The Divine is part of the musical score that leads to
the practice of radical altruism.
Another important thinker is Sarah Coakley, a Christian feminist theologian. Her
collection of essays, entitled Powers and Submissions is a particularly relevant attempt
toward a contemporary Christian feminist rehabilitation of kenosis. Coakley appreciates
297
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the movement of secular feminism but believes a crucial gift that Christian feminists can
offer their secular counterparts is a reconstruction of the idea of submission and selfsurrender. She says in her first essay of the book, “it will be the burden of this essay,
then, to offer a defence of some version of kenōsis as not only compatible with feminism,
but vital to a distinctively Christian manifestation of it, a manifestation which does not
eschew, but embraces, the spiritual paradoxes of ‘losing one’s life in order to save it.’”298
Coakley later defines her version of the “bewildering number of evocations” of kenosis
as “power-in-vulnerability.”299 While kenosis needs to be refined and clarified, Coakley
is an example of a theologian operating from a feminist standpoint that believes kenosis
is part of the central mystery of Christian salvation.
Coakley, like Balthasar, utilizes Christian spirituality to describe the kenotic event
of love. Coakley believes that it is through contemplative prayer that kenosis becomes a
“special form of ‘vulnerability’ [that] is not an invitation to be battered; nor is its silence
a silencing. . . . By choosing to ‘make space’ in this way, one ‘practises’ the ‘presence of
God’ – the subtle but enabling presence of a God who neither shouts nor forces, let alone
‘obliterates.’”300 Kenosis forms the practice of making space for the other in love. This
making space does not have to come with the cost of remaining silent or being battered.
Coakley’s emphasis and interpretation of the Phillippians passage of Scripture
moves in a different direction than Balthasar’s, however. She sees the kenosis as related
to human actions of Jesus rather than the emptying being a “precondition of the earthly
life.” This distinction echoes Balthasar’s believe that there is not a sense in which divine
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attributes have to be stripped away in order for the Son to become incarnate. But
Balthasar believes that the Divine is already kenotic, already emptying, so that Jesus’
human activity is mirroring the prior Trinitarian activity.
Coakley and Balthasar both share a desire to move away from philosophical
questions on the two natures of Christ and move into a narrative mode in which Jesus’
vulnerability is construed as a strength. However, Balthasar still retains an essentialism in
regard to gender that would typify weakness as a feminine trait, albeit, a trait of positive
value, not one of detriment. Coakley rightly argues that these typifications result in some
problematic understandings of kenosis. In fact, one might argue that Balthasar, in
describing receptivity and submission as feminine traits, yet asking all Christians to
participate in them, might be attempting to evacuate his own masculinist guilt. This is of
course a speculative statement, but is grounded in some real concerns raised by Coakley.
Balthasar simply did not have a contemporary awareness of the influence of gender on
theological statements. It is indeed a disjunction that others have noticed. Coakley’s
observations on gender and power provide a way to further refine Balthasar’s theology of
kenotic love in ways that are more nuanced in relationship to gender and power dynamics
in the world.
The last theologian to be considered in this series of speculations of kenosis and
Balthasar’s theology is Sallie McFague, who has had a distinguished career as a
Protestant feminist theologian. In particular I wish to focus on her recent book, Blessed
are the Consumers: Climate Change and the Practice of Restraint. This work is
structured to address two contemporary issues: first world consumer culture and the
destruction of the earth as a result of that consumption. McFague takes the idea of
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kenosis, found within the lives of saints (in particular she uses John Woolman, Simone
Weil, and Dorothy Day) to argue that Christian discipleship is directly opposed to
capitalist consumer culture. Like Balthasar, she envisions Christianity’s most vital
expression (found in the saints) to be radical self-giving love. McFague wants to reframe
Christian discipleship to move in the opposite direction of Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s
notion that “self-development is a higher duty than self-sacrifice.” Instead McFague
argues that the “goal of human life” moves “from self-fulfillment to self-emptying.”301
McFague takes the similar empahsis found in Balthasar on radical self-giving and
interprets it within a global framework and the very real consequences for our world.
Balthasar’s own context did not quite recognize the dangers inherent in human usage of
the earth’s resources although he did recognize the alienation and individualization of
modern industrial society. The underlying idea found in McFague that extends the
meaning of the kenosis motif is that kenosis helps Christians to enact practices that result
in care for the Earth and for the other by restraining impulse in contemporary society to
find the agency of the self tied to purchases and consumption of resources.
McFague’s last chapter in particular lays out a kenotic theology to provide
rationale for why Christians should be concerned with the limited resources and
destruction of the environment. McFague argues that “A kenotic theology is therefore an
incarnational theology, a theology that focuses unapologetically on ‘food,’ the lowliest,
most basic need shared by all living beings . . .but is a theology that begins with need.”302
Yet, McFague is not avoiding the divine in order to focus solely on ethical concerns. She
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goes on to say that “this model suggests that all flesh, all matter, is included within God
(as God’s ‘body’) but that God is not limited to this body, to matter. Here, God is
understood to be ‘more than’ the body, more than the world, but intimately, radically, and
inclusively identified with it.”303 This connection with food and this argument that matter
is part of God’s body is foreign to Balthasar’s conception. I suspect that Balthasar would
see this mode of thought as a blending of the real distinction between creator and creature
that Balthasar worked so hard to maintain in his theology. Yet, McFague’s suggestion
that God is bound up with the fate of the earthly “in a network of physicality,
vulnerability, and need” is not biblically or theologically sound. It collapses divine
kenosis into a complete powerlessness and is in danger of losing the difference between
the creature and creator. Although McFagues’s notion of a “universal self” would cause
Bathasar some concern, if we let this radical language stand and interpret it in an
apophatic manner similar to what was suggested in Chapter Three, it might allow
Christians to truly grasp the value of the created order, something that Balthasar was very
concerned about in his own way.
McFague’s approach offers value in that she frames ecological and consumeristic
concerns in terms of very real and necessary Christian spiritual practices. We are
systematically destroying our world and we are unwilling to accept the effects of the
capitalist system on our souls and the souls of our brothers and sisters. McFague also
improves upon Balthasar in the area of religious dialogue. It holds some value as well in
her willingness to extend the dialogue with other religious traditions in the hopes of a
more inclusive and cooperative approach to caring for the earth. Balthasar’s arguably
303
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Christian triumphalist reading of the ideas of autonomy and absorption as errors inherent
within the other world religions religions is problematic. These are two areas in which
Balthasar did not provide a great deal of input.
Nevertheless, my one main initial criticism of McFague’s work in this book is her
doctrine of God. In describing God almost exclusively in terms of weakness with little
disconnect from the earth, she threatens to undo some of the most important aspects of
Christian theology: the belief in a God who creates from freedom, and through that
freedom, gives himself willingly to those who rejected him. God’s divine self-surrender
is not just part of the world process but a freely given gift.
Wyschogrod, Coakley, and McFague provide a sampling of the important ways
that kenotic language can retain its biblical and theological center and bear fruit within
contemporary theologians’ scholarly work. Wychogrod’s work highlights the saintly and
the ethical. Coakley highlights the issue of gender and spiritual practice. McFague
expands kenosis to include a response to ecological concerns. Balthasar’s own work in
kenotic discourse is richly varied and provides an important source for contemporary
theologians concern with forming new ways to understand God’s divine self-gift and the
human response.
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